The initiation of disciplinary proceedings by an incompetent officer does not necessarily invalidate the entire enquiry, and the workman can lead evidence to justify the proposed action.

Mohan, C.J.—All these cases can be dealt with under a common judgment since they arise out of the same proceedings relating to the appellant-workman.

2. We propose to refer to the parties as arrayed in Writ Appeal No. 3322/1986.

3. The appellant-S. Nagaiah joined the services of the 1st respondent (Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd.) on 13th January 1971 as a workman. He was promoted as an Operator in 1971 itself. A lock-out was declared on 29th April, 1980 by the Management which ultimately came to be lifted on 16th July, 1980. Concerning this lock-out an industrial dispute was raised and I.D.8/1980 was pending on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore (later transferred to the Industrial Tribunal, Hubli and numbered as I.D. 17/1983). About 30 workers including the appellant were issued the charge memos. As far as the appellant is concerned he was issued two charge memoranda dated 14th April, 1980 and 29th April, 1980. Both these memoranda were signed by one Mr. S. S. Saihgal, General Production Superintendent (Alumina). As a sequel to this, the appellant was placed under suspension on 14th April, 1980. He submitted his explanations on 16th April, 1980 and 5th May, 1980 denying the charges. Notices of enquiry were issued on 19th April, 1980 and 6th May, 1980. Both of them were signed by Mr. R. K. Bhargave, General Works Manager. The appellant represented that enquiries might be postponed till the lock-out was lifted and that he was handicapped that the witnesses were not available because of the lock-out and also in view of the prevailing tension. Thereafter the appellant fell sick and he was undergoing treatment from E. S. I. Hospital, to which effect he produced certificate to the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer did not comply with the request of the workman-appellant. He conducted the enquiry and submitted a report dated 6th June, 1980. He found that the appellant was guilty of the charges levelled against him under Standing Orders 22(ii)(d)(iii)(v)(A), (xx)(xxiv)(xxv)(xxxi) and (xiv). In respect of other charges he was acquitted. Concerning the other enquiry he found by his report dated 17th June, 1980 that the appellant was guilty of clauses 22(d) (i), v(a) and (b) and (xxiii). On receipt of these reports a show cause notice was issued on 8th July, 1980 signed by the said R. K. Bhargava, General Works Manager calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the service of the Company and whether or not there were any mitigating or extenuating circumstances by which he could re-consider the proposed decision of dismissal. On 11th July, 1980 the appellant furnished a reply stating that he was not bound by the findings of the Enquiry Officer and that he had denied the charges levelled against him. Therefore, the question of taking any action does not arise. On 14th July, 1980 a registered letter was sent to the appellant stating that the Management had finally decided to dismiss the appellant from the service of the Company with effect from 15th July, 1980. It was also mentioned therein that in view of the pendency of the industrial dispute in I. D. No. 8/1980 before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, permission was being sought by the Management as required under Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rule made therein for dismissing the appellant as mentioned above. The appellant would be issued the dismissal order after obtaining of the permission. Consequent to this the 1st respondent-Management filed an application under Section 33(1) of the I.D. Act before the Industrial Tribunal, praying for grant of permission to dismiss the appellant. The application came to be numbered as Serial Application No. 64/1980 and renumbered as Serial Application No. 26/1983 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, which was later transferred to Hubli.

4. Before the Tribunal it was contended that the charge memos A-3 and A-4 had not been issued by the Company Authority