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1965 Supreme(Kar) 106

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
K.S. Hegde and C. Honniah, JJ.
Abdul Karim Mehtab Ali —Appellant
Vs.
The City Municipality Gulbarga and another —Respondent
Writ Petition No. 1620 of 1963
Decided on : 19-08-1965

Advocates:
Advocate appeared:
Mr. Appa Rao, for the Appellant
Mr. Muralidhara Rao, T. Krishna, Muralidara Rao, for the Respondent

Taxing provisions must be clear and unambiguous, and any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the subject. The widest meaning should not be given to the language to effectuate the intention of the legislature in the context of taxing provisions.

Headnote:

Octroi Duty - Municipal Tax - Hyderabad District Municipalities Act - Section 96(1)(b), Section 109 - Interpretation of Taxing Provision

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a merchant, sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the 1st respondent Municipality from levying octroi duty on fresh fruits brought into the Gulbarga Municipal area for sale. The dispute centered on the interpretation of Section 96(1)(b) and Section 109 of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, specifically the scope of entry (d) under the heading 'Edible' in Schedule 'D' of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the legislature did not intend to levy octroi on all fruits, irrespective of the manner in which they are imported. It emphasized that taxing provisions must be clear and unambiguous, and any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the subject. The court also rejected the argument that the widest meaning should be given to the language to effectuate the intention of the legislature, stating that such interpretation is not applicable to taxing provisions.

Issues: The key issue was the interpretation of the taxing provision under the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, specifically the scope of entry (d) under the heading 'Edible' in Schedule 'D' of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that taxing provisions must be clear and unambiguous, and any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the subject. It also highlighted that the widest meaning should not be given to the language to effectuate the intention of the legislature in the context of taxing provisions.

Final Decision: The writ petition was allowed, and a writ of mandamus was issued to the first respondent requiring it not to collect any octroi from the petitioner in respect of the fruits mentioned, except when they are canned, tinned, bottled, boxed, or cartooned. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the petitioner.

ORDER

1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner's counsel at the time of the hearing, asked the court to issue a writ of mandamus to the 1st respondent requiring it not to levy any octroi duty on the fruits brought by him into the Gulbarga Municipal area, in the course of his trade The other reliefs prayed for in the petition were not pressed.

2. The petitioner is a merchant having his place of business in the market area of the Gulbarga Town. He is dealing in fresh fruits. According to him, he purchases fresh fruits from outside the Municipal area and brings them to Gulbarga town for sale in his shop. He deals in Sithaphal, Bannana, Moosambi, Plantains, Mangoes. Jam, Jambun, Apple, Orange Grape, Pinapple, Melons and Water-melons. The fruits brought by him into the Municipal limits of the Gulbarga town were neither canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartooned. The facts stated above are not disputed by the respondents. All that we have to see is, whether the 1st respondent Municipality has competence to levy octroi on the fruits in question.

3. Section 96(1)(b) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act (Hyderabad Act XVIII of 1956), to be hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', empowers the Municipality to levy octroi. Section 109 of the Act provides:

"Except as hereinafter provided, octroi, at rates not exceeding those respectively specified in Schedule 'D' shall be levied in respect of the several articles mentioned in the said schedule or of so many of them as the Committee shall from year to year, determine when the said articles are imported from any place into the Municipality."

Schedule 'D' of the Act reads as follows:--

(Schedule 'D' reproduced.)

*****

4. The question for determination is as to the true scope of entry (d) under the heading 'Edible', in Schedule 'D' of the Act. That entry reads:

"Fruits (canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartooned)."

According to the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, all fruits including those that are canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartooned are liable to octroi. But according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, only fruits that are either canned or tinned or bottled or boxed or cartooned are liable to octroi. The question is as to which of these two contentions is correct.

5. It must be remembered that we are called upon to interpret a taxing provision. No tax can be levied on a subject by mere implication. Before either a person or an article can be taxed, the provision imposing tax must be clear and unambiguous. If a provision can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, the interpretation that helps the subject will have to be accepted. As has been often said, the courts will not spell out a levy by adding to the statute or by giving the statute an extended meaning. As observed by Maxwell on his Interpretation of Statutes (tenth edition) at p. 288:

"In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used."

The entry to which we referred earlier, does not say that all fruits including those that are canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartooned are liable to octroi. If the intention of the Legislature was to levy octroi on all fruits irrespective of the manner in which they are imported, nothing would have been easier than to say so in the entry. It would have been sufficient if the legislature had merely mentioned the word 'fruits' in entry '(d)'. There was no occasion, muchless a necessity for mentioning within the brackets, 'canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartooned'.

6. It is not denied by the learned counsel, for the first respondent that many of the articles shown under the heading 'Edible' can be canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartooned. But yet, those words were included within the brackets only in entries (d), (e) and (p) a










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