The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and applicability of s. 147(a) and s. 147(b) for reopening concluded assessments, and the scope of s. 153(3)(ii) of the I.T. Act, 1961.

Puttaswamy, J.—Among others, the petitioner, who is an assessee on the file of the Sixth ITO, Hubli Circle, Hubli, respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the ITO"), under the I.T. Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), owned certain lands in the City of Hubli, which were acquired by the Govt. on October 4, 1957, for a public purpose. On March 29, 1965, the petitioner received certain amounts as compensation from the Land Acquisition Officer, with which the civil court on a reference did not interfere.

2. But, on an appeal filed by the petitioner in M.F.A. No. 279 of 1972, this court by its judgment and decree dated March 12, 1974 (exhibit F), considerably enhanced the compensation, in terms of which he received the difference of enhanced compensation and interest on January 27, 1975.

3. For the assessment years 1969-70 to 1972-73 relevant to accounting years ending with the relevant calendar years, the petitioner filed his returns before the ITO, who by his orders dated December 8, 1969, December 9, 1970, and March 24, 1973 (exhibits A to D), concluded the assessments for the said years. But in the four notices bearing No. PN 4461 dated March 18, 1978, (exhibits M to P), issued under s. 148 of the Act, the ITO has called upon the petitioner to file his returns for the aforesaid assessment years, the validity of which are challenged by him in these petitions under article 226 of the Constitution.

4. The petitioner has asserted that he had made a full and true disclosure of all material facts for the relevant assessment years and accepting the same, the ITO had completed the assessments under the Act and there was no justification to reopen those concluded assessments under s. 147 of the Act. On this premise, the petitioner has urged that the notices issued on March 18, 1978, were also barred by time.

5. In his return, the respondent has asserted that the order made by this court in M.F.A. No. 279 of 1972 (exhibit F) and the amounts received thereto have necessarily to be brought to tax for the relevant assessment years and for such cases, the bar of limitation stipulated in s. 153(1) and (2) of the Act has no application.

6. At the hearing, Sri H. Raghavendra Rao, learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent, had placed before the court the proceedings drawn up by the ITO, on the basis of which he had issued the impugned notices to the petitioner, which have been perused by Sri K. S. Ramabhadran, learned counsel for the petitioner.

7. Sri Ramabhadran contends that on the very reasons recorded by the ITO in his proceedings, it was not open to him to reopen the concluded assessments for the relevant assessment years. Elaborating his contention, Sri Ramabhadran maintained that for the relevant assessment years, the petitioner had made a full and true disclosure of all the material facts and accepting them, the ITO had concluded his assessment and the modification of the award made by this court in M.F.A. 279 of 1972, and the amounts received thereto on January 27, 1975, did not constitute a failure to fully and truly disclose the material facts for the relevant assessment years to justify their reopening. In support of his contention, Sri Ramabhadran strongly relies on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Company Limited Vs. Income-tax Officer, Companies District, I and Another, AIR 1961 SC 372.

8. Sri Raghavendra Rao sought to justify the impugned notices on the basis of the reasons recorded by the ITO and also on other grounds that will be noticed by me and dealt with in due course.

9. When the petitioner filed his returns for the relevant assessment years, a claim made by the petitioner before the civil court or this court was pending. But, that claim had neither fructified into a favourable decree nor had the petitioner received any amounts in pursuance of that decree. The pendency of legal proceedings or a claim made under the Acquisition Act cannot be characterised as a material f