The Board has the power to consider the desirability or expediency of awarding relief under the Income Tax Act even after the expiry of the period of limitation, for avoiding genuine hardship in a given case.

G.C. Bharuka, J.—The appellant is a Government company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. For the benefit of its employees, it has created a trust by name Mysore Sales International Ltd. Employees' Super-annotation Fund Trust and thereafter it made an application under Part B of Schedule IV to the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for approval thereof. But, since the same was not approved, it preferred an appeal before the CBDT under rule 8 of Part B of Schedule IV to the Act. But the same came to be rejected by the Board under its order dt. 7th January, 1992, on the ground that the same was filed beyond the prescribed period of 60 days and there being no provision for the condonation of delay, the appeal was not entertainable. Against the said order, the appellant-company preferred W.P. No. 11591 of 1992, which has been dismissed by the learned single judge under the impugned order dt. 27th September, 1994, inter alia, approving the view taken by the Board on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sakuru Vs. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has taken the view that if under any special statute there is no provision for condonation of delay or for extension of the period of limitation, then the same cannot be done by the quasi-judicial or the statutory authorities since the discretion conferred under s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be exercised only by the Courts.

2. After we have heard Mr. Sarangan, learned senior counsel for the appellant-company, and Sri M. V. Seshachala, learned standing counsel for the IT Department, with regard to the applicability of s. 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal preferred under rule 8, Part B of Schedule IV of the Act, in view of the provisions contained in cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 119 of the Act, it is not necessary to enter into that controversy. Sec. 119(2)(b) of the Act reads as follows :

"(b) the Board may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order, authorise any IT authority, not being a Dy. CIT(A) or CIT(A) to admit an application or claim for any exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under this Act after the expiry of the period specified by or under this Act for making such application or claim and deal with the same on merits in accordance with law."

3. It cannot be disputed that the Board is one of the Income Tax authorities as enumerated under s. 116 of the Act. Therefore, keeping in view the provisions noticed above, the Board has sufficient power to consider the desirability or expediency of awarding a relief under the Act even after the expiry of the period of limitation provided under any specific provision and dispose of the matter on the merits in accordance with law provided it is intended for avoiding genuine hardship in a given case. It appears from the impugned order passed by the Board that its attention to the said provision was not drawn and, therefore, it has failed to apply itself to this benevolent provision.

4. We, therefore, quash the impugned order passed by the Board setting liberty to it to pass appropriate orders in terms of cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 119 of the Act, provided an application is filed by the appellant-company making out a case for invoking the said jurisdiction of the Board.

5. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the learned single judge is set aside. No costs.