Aggrieved by the order dated 21.12.2009 passed by the learned District Judge & Educational Appellate Tribunal, Uttara Kannada, Karwar, the petitioner has approached this Court.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, Noorjahan Abdul Shukur Shaikh was appointed on 01.06.1995 by the Nida-E-Tauheed Trust as an Assistant Teacher. She continued to work for the said Trust till 10.04.2007. However, when she reported back to the Trust for continuing teaching in their school on 30.05.2008, she was not permitted to sign the attendance register. Therefore, according to her, she was verbally removed from her service without following due process of law. Aggrieved by the action of the Trust, she filed an appeal under Section 94 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983, (‘the Act’ for short) before the learned Tribunal. However, by the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has dismissed her appeal. Hence, this petition before this Court.

3. Mr. Anant Savadi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has raised following contentions before this Court: firstly, the appointment of the petitioner was not a temporary one, as there is no letter to show that her appointment was on yearly basis. Secondly, even if her appointment were on a temporary basis, Section 92 of the Act deals with dismissal and removal of an employee of unaided school. According to the proviso attached to Section 92(1) of the Act, an employee can be removed or dismissed without following the procedure contemplated under Section 92 of the Act, in case if he or she commits a misconduct, involving moral turpitude, which has lead to her/his conviction by the criminal court. However, in the present case the petitioner was not convicted by the criminal court for any misconduct involving moral turpitude. Yet she has been removed from her service without following the procedure established by law. Thirdly, since Section 92 of the Act has been flouted, the petitioner was well justified in filing an appeal under Section 94 of the Act. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal that since the petitioner was merely a temporary employee, since her services came to naught due to flux of time, she has not been removed, is an incorrect finding. Moreover, the conclusion drawn by the learned Tribunal that the petitioner’s case does not fall under Section 94 of the Act, therefore, the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal, is an misplaced conclusion. Hence, the order deserves to be interfered with.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Javed, the learned Counsel for the respondent-Trust, has placed following contentions before this Court: firstly, the petitioner was temporarily appointed on 01.06.2003. Her services were continued on yearly basis. This fact would be clear from the certificate submitted by the petitioner, herself, before the learned Tribunal. She had submitted the certificate which clearly showed that her appointment was from 01.06.1995 till 07.07.2001, from 01.12.1996 till 10.04.1997, from 01.06.1997 till 10.04.1998, from 01.06.1998 till 10.04.1999, from 1.06.1999 till 10.04.2000, from 01.06.2000 till 10.04.2001, from 01.06.2001 till 10.04.2002, 01.06.2002 to 10.04.2003, 1.6.2003 to 10.4.2004, 1.6.2004 to 10.4.2005, 01.06.2005 to 10.04.2006 and 01.06.2006 till 10.04.2007. Since her appointment was a temporary one, she did not have a lien over the post of Assistant Teacher. Once her temporary appointment, for a limited period came, to an end, she was not permitted to rejoin the service. Secondly, the proviso to Section 92(1) of the Act clearly states that subsection (1) would not apply to a temporary employee. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner was not permitted to rejoin her service does not amount to a removal, or dismissal from service. Hence, the procedure established for inflicting the punishment of removal, or dismissal need not have been followed. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was justified in concluding that since neither she was removed