1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents.

2. The petitioner was married to Smt. Rani, who is said to have been a patient of the second respondent, a Gynaecologist. It is alleged that on account of negligence on the part of the said respondent in performing a Laparoscopic procedure on Smt Rani, she is said to have died after much suffering, on 28.7.2013. On a complaint by the petitioner before the jurisdictional police, apart from initiating criminal proceedings against respondent no.2, the police are said to have forwarded the case papers to Karnataka Medical Council, Bangalore, (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘KMC’, for brevity), which is said to have initiated suo motu proceedings and an enquiry is on against respondent no.2 before the said authority.

It is stated that the parties were represented by counsel before the KMC and the pleadings are complete. The petitioner is said to have filed an affidavit in evidence and the matter was scheduled for his cross-examination as on 23.5.2013. On that day, the third respondent is said to have filed a power of attorney to enter appearance on behalf of respondent no.2. The petitioner's counsel is said to have protested and had pointed out that an application under Section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘1961 Act’, for brevity) or under Order III Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’, for brevity), was not forthcoming, to enable the said respondent to enter appearance. The said objection having been overruled by the KMC, the witness was partly cross-examined and the matter stood adjourned to 27.6.2013.

It transpires that the petitioner had, by the next date, learnt that the third respondent was a practising Obstetrician and Gynaecologist and that he conducts cases of medical negligence across various consumer fora and State Medical Councils and has adopted it as his profession. This is admitted by the third respondent himself in published articles posted on the internet.

The petitioner had hence filed an interlocutory application on 27.6.2013, seeking that the power of attorney filed by the third respondent be rejected and to expunge all action and proceeding undertaken pursuant thereto. The KMC had merely adjourned the matter for further cross examination on 1.8.2013. As this was a virtual rejection of the petitioner's prayer, the present petition is filed.

3. It is contended that where a person, being a power of attorney seeks to represent a party to a proceeding on a standalone basis and not as a matter of practice, such party ought to file an application under Section 32 of the 1961 Act, and the court may permit such representation, if deemed appropriate. That the first respondent has, vide impugned order dated 23.5.2013, permitted a power of attorney holder, who is not an advocate, to represent the second respondent under Section 32 of the 1961 Act. Thus, it is clear that the first respondent has not applied its mind while permitting a power of attorney to represent the second respondent. Therefore, it is contended that the impugned order is liable to be quashed.

It is contended that by virtue of a Power of Attorney, a party to a proceeding may at best give powers to represent such party’s case in the proceeding for the limited purpose of signing and verifying requisite pleadings, that too in the absence of the party. A Power of Attorney cannot be granted to a lay person for doing any other act or thing, including to act as an Advocate to plead on behalf of the party. However, by virtue of having procured the power of attorney in his favour, Prof. Shenoy has attempted to appear, act and plead as an Advocate on behalf of the respondent No.2, which is impermissible in law.

It is contended that respondent no.1 has, by the impugned order, permitted a power of attorney holder, who is not an Advocate to represent respondent No.2 in the proceedings before i