H.G. RAMESH, J.

1. Whether Court has power under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal after setting aside an arbitral award, is the question that requires determination in this appeal. The question is answered in the negative.

2. This appeal under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996(‘the Act’ for short) is directed against an order dated 29.08.2015 passed by the Court of the Principal District Judge, Dharwad, in Arbitration Suit No.1/2015. The appellant herein was the plaintiff before the trial Court in the aforesaid suit. The aforesaid suit (Application) was filed under Section 34 of the Act against an arbitral award dtd. 06.01.2014. By the impugned order, the arbitral award dated 06.01.2014 has been set aside and the matter is remitted to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration with a direction to the appellant herein to restore the Bank guarantee. The impugned order was passed by the Court on the application (I.A. No.2) filed by the respondent-South Western Railway to remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal.

3. By consent of learned counsel on both sides, the appeal is finally heard on merits and is being disposed of by this order.

4. Sri K.G. Raghavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the Court below has erred in law in setting aside the arbitral award and remitting the matter to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration without examining the matter as provided under Section 34 of the Act. He submitted that no power of remand is conferred on the Court under Section 34 of the Act. But the Court may, as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act, where it is appropriate and if it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of the arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. In support of his submission, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd [(2006) 11 SCC 181] and specifically invited our attention to para 52 therein. He also submitted that the appellant did not seek for remand of the matter to the arbitral tribunal and the observation by the Court below to the contrary is factually not correct.

5. Smt. Anuradha Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Railway submitted that the impugned order does not warrant interference.

6. To examine the contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, it is relevant to extract Section 34 of the Act:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-

(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that-

(i) a party was under some incapacity, or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or

(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:

Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral proce