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2016 Supreme(Kar) 581

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN And SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR, JJ.
National Highways Authority of India Project Implementation Unit - Appellant
Versus
Udaykumar s/o Basappa Neglur and Ors. - Respondents
W.A. Nos. 31169-31180 of 2013 (GM-RES)
Decided On : 06-12-2016

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Sachin S Magadum
For the Respondents: S.M. Kalwad

Headnote:NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT, 1956 – Section 3-G(5) – Reference to arbitration – Limitation – Absence of specific limitation under statute – General law of limitation would stand excluded.

JUDGMENT :

Aggrieved by the order dated 15.02.2013, passed by the learned Single Judge, in W.P. Nos.63433/2011 & 76142-76152/2013, the National Highways Authority of India has approached this Court. Before the learned Single Judge the appellant had challenged the order dated 24.02.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Arbitrator, who had condoned the delay of four years in initiating the arbitration proceedings by respondent Nos.1 to 14. Since the learned Single Judge has upheld the said condonation of delay, the appellant is before this Court.

2. Briefly the facts of the case are that, respondent nos.1 to 14 were the land owners of different parcels of the lands situated in Kavalettu Village, in Ranebennur Taluk, of Haveri District. In 2001, in order to widen the National Highway-4 from kilometer 282 to 515 (Haveri, Dharwad, Belgaum) the Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, while exercising its powers under the National Highways Act initiated acquisition of land under Section 3A of the National Highways Act (‘the Act’ for short). The acquisition proceedings culminated in award dated 14.01.2004. However, as the respondent nos.1 to 14 were aggrieved by the compensation being granted to them, on 19.11.2009, they sought an arbitral reference under Section 3G(5) of the Act before the Arbitrator. The appellant filed their objections.

The appellant pleaded that, since no period of limitation has been prescribed by the Act, for filing of a reference before an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the Act, Article 137 of the Limitation Act would have to be read. Since according to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed is three years, therefore the arbitral reference filed by respondent nos.1 to 14 after a lapse of 5 years is patently hit by limitation. Therefore, the arbitral reference should be dismissed by the learned arbitrator.

However, by order dated 24.02.2010 the said contention raised by the appellant was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner, and the delay of five years was condoned. Since the appellant was aggrieved by the order dated 24.02.2010, it filed writ petitions before this Court. However, by the impugned order dated 15.02.2015, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the order dated 24.02.2010. Hence, these appeals before this Court.

3. Mr. Sachin S. Magadum, the learned counsel for the appellant, has reiterated the contentions raised before the learned Arbitrator, and has pleaded that since Section 3G(5) of the Act does not prescribe any period of limitation, therefore an application filed before the Arbitrator would be covered by the limitation period prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Since Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for filing of an application, the arbitral reference made under Section 3G(5) of the Act could not be filed after the lapse of three years. Moreover the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not available to the learned Arbitrator. Therefore the learned Arbitrator should have accepted the contention raised by the appellant.

Secondly the learned Single Judge has erred in relying upon Article 14 of the Constitution of India; the learned Judge has missed the point raised by the appellant with regard to the applicability of the Article 137 of the Limitation Act, and with regard to the non-availability of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the learned Arbitrator. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside by this Court.

4. On the other hand, Sri S.M. Kalwad, the learned counsel for respondent nos.1 to 14, has relied on the case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and Others {(1997) 6 SCC 73}, in order to support his plea that even if a special statute does not prescribe the period of limitation, even then the general law of limitation is inapplicable. Hence the question of applicability of Article 137 of the











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