1. The trial court has passed an order under Section 306 of Cr.P.C on an application filed by the appellant herein who was the complainant in Special C.C.No.223/2017 on the file of the XLIX Additional City Civil Judge & Special Judge for NIA cases. Appeal provision is provided under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, which reads as follows:

“21. Appeals. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.

(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail.

(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:

Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days:

Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days.”

Therefore, it clearly goes to show that an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order not being an Interlocutory order of Special Court to the High Court, both on facts and on law. Even sub-clause [3] of Section 21 also says that except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an Interlocutory order of a Special Court.

2. It is worth to mention here, a decision of the full bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE OF UP VS. KAILASH NATH AGARWAL & OTHERS ((1973) 1 SCC 751), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the old provisions of Sections 337 and 338 of Cr.P.C., which governs the procedure regarding tender of pardon by the Magistrates, has held that, any order passed by the Magistrate on the application for tendering pardon, is not an interlocutory order and the same is revisable. At paragraphs 20 and 21, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with this particular aspect, which reads thus:

“20. The further question is whether the State should have filed a revision against the order of the Magistrate, dated September 27, 1965, refusing to grant pardon instead of approaching the District magistrate for the same purpose. This raised the question whether an order refusing to grant pardon is revisable? The High Court has taken the view that the said order is revisable and that the State, if it was aggrieved, should have filed a revision before the Sessions Judge. We have already referred to the fact that the first respondent had filed a revision before the Sessions Court against the order of the District Magistrate, dated June 1, 1966. This revision has been held by the High Court to be a proper one. As we have held that the District Magistrate has got concurrent powers and that he can be approached under Section 337 even after the Magistrate enquiring into the offence has declined to grant pardon, the question whether the State should have filed a revision against the order of the Magistrate becomes really academic. On the view expressed by us, the State was justified in approaching the District Magistrate even after the Magistrate had refused to grant pardon.

21. However, the question regarding the revisability of an order granting pardon arises regarding the competency of the revision filed by the first respondent before the Sessions Cour