K.N. Phaneendra, J.

This appeal is preferred against the order dated 26.9.2013 in O.S.No.247/2011 passed on I.A.No.4 by the Senior Civil Judge and J.M.F.C., Nelamangala, under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The said application was contested before the Trial Court and the Trial court has allowed the said application and plaint was rejected.

2. The brief factual matrix of the case, which are briefly stated, as follows:

The plaintiff has filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 9.10.2002 alleged to have been executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff in order to alienate the suit schedule property i.e., land bearing Sy.No.52/3 measuring 4 acres situated at Lakshmipura Village, Dasanapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The plaintiff has also sought for an alternative relief directing the defendants to refund the advance consideration with Bank rate interest in the ends of justice.

3. The admitted facts between the parties are that the suit land was a granted land and it falls under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 ('the Act' for brevity). The grant was made to a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes person and it is also an admitted fact that it is a contingent agreement entered into between the parties stating that the permission of the Government for alienation of the said land or transfer of the said land is a condition precedent either for the purpose of transferring the said property or acquiring the title over the said property. After due contest of the said application, the Trial Court relying upon various decisions has rejected the plaint in toto.

4. The learned Counsel for the appellant strenuously contends before this Court that the Trial court has not properly appreciated and interpreted the provision under sub-Section (2) of Section 4 of the Act with reference to Section 3 of the said enactment and the court has treated the agreement of sale on par with sale deed in order to interpret the word "transfer" as contained in Section 4(2) of the said enactment. Instead, the court ought to have given interpretation that the transfer should not include the agreement. The transfer is permitted under the enactment but the rider put under the Act is that the previous sanction of the Government is an absolute requirement for the purpose of transferring the said land. Learned Counsel further strenuously contends that, for the purpose of entering into an agreement, no permission of the Government is required because Section 4(2) of the Act only contemplates that no person can acquire or transfer the said land without previous permission of the Government. Therefore, the word "transfer" has to be interpreted in such a manner that the transfer of property only divests the title from one person to another person. The agreement will not in any manner divest any right, title or interest over the property in favour of any person. Therefore, such interpretation ought to have been given to the word "transfer" in Section 4(2) of the Act.

5. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents strenuously contends before the court that in view of Section 3 of the Act, the special enactment itself describes what is meant by "transfer". Said Section also includes the agreement to sell as transfer though the general law and general interpretation of the word "transfer" defines it as divesting of the right, title and interest in favour of a person. Hence, agreement of sale though do not convey any right, title or interest over the property, but in view of Section 3 of the Act, it should be treated on par with a sale itself. Therefore, the word "transfer" has to be interpreted inclusive of the agreement to sell. That is what exactly has been done by the trial court in rejecting the plaint. Therefore, no interference is called for by this court.

6. On a careful perusal of the order passed by the Trial court, makes it clear that, the trial cour