2018 Supreme(Kar) 1202
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN, H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD, JJ.
Syed Ifthekar Ahmed S/O Late Syed Shafiq Ahmed – Petitioner
Versus
State By Karnataka Lokayuktha City Division And Ors. – Respondents
Criminal Petition No.2721, 2320, 4527, 4526, 4528 of 2017
Decided On : 10-10-2018
For the Petitioner: Sri Nagendra Naik R., Adv.
For the Respondent: Sri V. S. Arbatti, Adv., Sri Sandesh J. Chouta, Aag A/W Sri. I. S. Pramod Chandra, SPP-II
Headnote:
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 - Civil, Procedure Code, 1908 - rule 1 - Order XLIII - Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 - Section 8 - Dealing with orders framing charge - Challenge of interlocutory order - Whether an order passed by Special Court rejecting application filed Section by an accused for discharge who is being prosecuted for offences punishable Prevention of Corruption Act would be amenable to provisional jurisdiction Section Whether an order rejecting application for discharge filed by accused or an order passed to proceed to frame charge against accused provisions Prevention of Corruption Act an interlocutory order and as such bar contained in Section would be attracted – Held, In our opinion happy solution of this problem would be to say that bar provided in sub-section operates only in exercise provisional power of High Court meaning thereby that High court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order - Then in accordance with one other principles enunciated above inherent power will come into play there being no other provision in Code for redress of grievance of aggrieved party - But then order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of revision power of High Court Code High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power - But in case impugned order clearly brings about situation which is an abuse of process Court or for purpose of securing ends of justice interference by High Court is absolutely necessary then nothing contained in Section can limit or affect exercise of inherent power by High Court - But such cases would be few and far between - High Court must exercise inherent power very sparingly - Answer is obvious that bar will not operate to prevent abuse of process Court and/or to secure ends of justice - Label of petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial – Order accordingly
ORDER :
RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN, J.
Twelve different Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions were filed under Section 482 Cr. P. C. before a learned Single Bench of this Court. In the said petitions, the petitioners had challenged either an order framing the charges, or an order refusing to discharge the accused, or an order dismissing applications for discharging the accused. Before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the petitioners had raised two contentions: firstly, an order framing the charge, or the order refusing to discharge the accused, or the order dismissing an application for discharge are not interlocutory orders. Instead, such orders are intermediate orders. Thus, such orders can be challenged under the revisional jurisdiction of this court under Section 397 (1) Cr. P. C. Since they are intermediate orders, they are not hit by the bar contained in Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. Secondly, in the alternative, since the cases deal with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act ("the P. C. Act", for short), the impugned orders can still be challenged under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if they cannot be challenged under the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 (1) Cr.P.C.
2. Faced with these two contentions, the learned Single Judge was confronted with two sets of contradictory decisions pronounced by different learned Single Benches of this Court. For, in P. V. Amarnath Prasad v. State by CBI /ACB, Bangalore [(2012) 4 Kant. L. J. 483], in Smt. A. C. Kamakshi v. Union of India [Crl.R.P.No.703/2009, decided on 24.02.2010] and in Sri Katta Subramanya Naidu v. State of Karnataka [Crl.R.P.No.432/2013, decided on 03.11.2016] while dealing with orders framing charge for offences under the P. C. Act, three different learned Single Benches had opined that the orders framing charge were not interlocutory orders. Hence, the said orders could be challenged under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397 (1) Cr.P.C.
3. However, a contrary view was expressed in the case of Dr. Pervin v. State of Karnataka [Crl.R.P. No.1652/2016, decided on 06.01.2017], wherein an order dismissing an application for discharge was challenged, in the case of Revanna and Others v. State of Karnataka [Crl.R.P.No.57/2017, decided on 24.03.2017] and in the case of Sri. T. Nagaraju v. State of Karnataka [Crl.R.P.No.935/2016, decided on 31.05.2017]. In these three cases, three different learned Single Benches declared that the impugned orders framing charges, or dismissing applications for discharge are interlocutory orders. Hence, such orders cannot be challenged under the revisional jurisdictions of this court under Section 397 (1) Cr.P.C. For, Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C., prohibits challenge of interlocutory order under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
4. Therefore, the learned Single Judge referred twin issues to a Division Bench under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 ("the High Court Act", for short). The twin issues are as under:
Whether an order passed by a Special Court rejecting the application filed under Section 239 Cr.P.C., r/w 227 Cr.P.C., by an accused for discharge, who is being prosecuted for offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, would be amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 (1) Cr.P.C. ?
OR
Whether an order rejecting the application for discharge filed by the accused or an order passed to proceed to frame the charge against the accused under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is an interlocutory order and as such the bar contained in Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C., would be attracted ?
5. Since only legal issues have been referred to this Bench, the narration of facts of each case is clearly unnecessary. However, few essential facts need to be pointed out: firstly, four of the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions, namely Crl. Misc. Petition No.3217/2017, Crl. Mis. Petition No.4526/2017, Crl. Misc. Petition 4527/2017, and Crl. Mis. Petition No.452