Point of Law; If the Appellate Court for the first time goes into the grounds urged and gives its own findings, perhaps one of the parties will be deprived of a right of statutory appeal provided in Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act

JUDGMENT :

On the last date, we have heard the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents.

2. By this appeal preferred under sub-section (1A) of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (for short, "the Commercial Courts Act"), the appellant has taken an exception to the judgment and order dated 25th September 2020 passed by a learned Judge of the Commercial Court at Bengaluru. By the said judgment and order, a petition filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, "the said Act of 1996") has been dismissed.

3. The challenge in the petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 was to the award dated 1st February 2016 made by the learned Sole Arbitrator. The arbitration clause was incorporated in the agreement dated 22nd August 2007 concerning construction of Aircraft hanger and associated facilities at Belur Campus, Bengaluru consisting of various works. The dispute was as regards the amount payable to the respondents for the work carried out. The dispute was referred to the learned Arbitrator.

4. The learned Arbitrator granted the claims made by the respondents partially. The award was made in the sum of Rs.1,07,05,858/-along with the interest at the rate of 10% per annum payable by the appellant.

5. Various submissions have been canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal. One of the main contentions raised is that the grounds which are urged by the appellant in support of the petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 have not been specifically dealt with by the learned Judge of the Commercial Court. The other submission is that the reasons have not been recorded for rejecting the challenge made by the appellant.

6. The learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment and order. He submitted that, in fact, no ground of challenge which is covered by Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 was made out and there is nothing wrong with the ultimate conclusion drawn by the learned Judge of the Commercial Court. He would submit that considering the limited scope of interference under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996, no fault can be found with the ultimate conclusion drawn by the learned Judge of the Commercial Court that there is no ground to interfere with the award.

7. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. As far as the scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 is concerned, the law is well settled. As far as the approach and scope of interference is concerned, we may make a reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of DYNA TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED vs. CROMPTION GREAVES LIMITED, (2019) 20 SCC 1 . In paragraphs 24 and 25, the Apex Court held thus:

"24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the Courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.

25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the Courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and inter