Point of Law: Compassionate appointment -Under no circumstances, the second wife nor her children are eligible for compassionate grounds appointment, if the marriage has taken place during the subsistence of the first marriage

JUDGMENT :

Though this appeal was listed to consider I.A.No.1/2019 seeking condonation of delay of 174 days in filing the appeal, on condoning the said delay and on disposal of I.A.No.1/2019 (vide separate order), with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, it is heard finally.

2. The appellant was the petitioner in W.P.No.16400/2015. In that petition, petitioner assailed communication bearing No. xxxxxxxxxxx 15/6884 dated 11.03.2015 addressed to respondent No.4 by respondent No.3 (Annexure-‘B’) and Circular bearing No.KPTCL/B5/721/80-81 dated 23.09.2011 issued by respondent No.1 (Annexure-‘D’) insofar as a portion of clause 2 is concerned, which reads as under:

“Under no circumstances, the second wife nor her children are eligible for compassionate grounds appointment, if the marriage has taken place during the subsistence of the first marriage.”

3. By order dated 15.12.2018, the learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition. Thereafter, Review Petition No.11/2019 was filed. The learned Single Judge dismissed the review petition also. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has assailed the aforesaid orders.

4. Succinctly stated, the facts are, the petitioner/appellant herein is the son of deceased Kabbalaiah, who was working as Lineman Grade-II. He died in harness on 10.06.2014. During his life time, he was married for the second time during the subsistence of his first marriage. Out of the second marriage, the petitioner was born. On the death of his father, petitioner made an application seeking appointment on compassionate basis under the Regulations titled Karnataka Electricity Board Employees’ Recruitment (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Regulations, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations” for the sake of convenience). The respondents rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that he was the son of the second wife of the deceased employee Kabbalaiah and his father had married his mother during the subsistence of his first marriage. Therefore, he was not entitled to appointment on compassionate basis. In that context, reliance was placed on the Circular dated 23.09.2011 issued by respondent No.1 i.e. the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as “KPTCL” for the sake of brevity), wherein in Clause 2, dealing with the eligibility for appointment on compassionate basis, it was stated that neither the second wife nor her children are eligible for compassionate grounds appointment, if the marriage had taken place during the subsistence of the first marriage. Being aggrieved by the communication dated 11.03.2015 and that portion of the Circular denying appointment on compassionate basis to children from the second marriage, while the first marriage of the deceased employee is in subsistence, the petitioner assailed the same in the writ petition. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition as well as the review petition, the petitioner has preferred this present appeal.

5. We have heard the learned counsel Sri. Subramanya Bhat M., for the appellant and Sri. Ravindra Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 4 and perused the material on record.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant at the outset submitted, the learned Single Judge was not right in dismissing the writ petition as well as review petition. He drew our attention to the Regulations to contend that Regulations 2(1)(a) and 3(2) state that the dependent son is entitled to be appointed on compassionate basis. That the appellant herein, as a dependent son of the deceased Board employee -Kabbalaiah, who was his father, was entitled to be appointed on compassionate grounds. It may be that he is the son of second wife of Kabbalaiah, but the said fact cannot be a ground to reject the application made by the appellant for appointment on compassionate basis.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that what is stated in Regulation 3(2)(a) is ‘son’, the same is not qualified by saying that the s