Rajadhyaksha, J.

1. We delivered the above oral judgment Reported in A. I. R. (38) 1951 Bom. 45 : 63 Bom. L.R. 112 in open Ct. on Wednesday September 13, a writ in terms of the order made by us was issued on the same day. The Ct. was closed on 15th, 16th 17th. On Monday the 18th morning, before we received the transcript of the oral judgment, both Mr. Amin, who had appeared for the accused, and the Advocate General saw me in the Chambers. Mr. Amin stated that if we had not signed the judgment, he would like the matter to be mentioned again in Ct. so far as the liability of the Directors, viz., accused 2 5, was concerned. I mentioned to them my doubts as to whether it was open to us to review a judgment which was orally delivered by us in open Ct. Both Mr, Amin the Advocate General promised to look into the point. On Monday evening I received the transcript of the oral judgment. But in view of the fact that the matter had been mentioned to me earlier in the day, we postponed the question of settling the judgment putting our initials to the transcript. Mr. Amin saw me in the Chambers on Wednesday the 20th, I suggested to him that he the Advocate General should mention the matter to us in open Ct. on next day. It was accordingly mentioned on the 21st morning, we have now had the matter argued before us.

2. Three points arise for our consideration. The first is whether it is open to us to review or alter a judgment which we delivered in open Ct. on September 13. Secondly, if it was open to us to review the judgment, what should be the limits of such a review. And lastly, if we had the power to review, the matter falls within the limits within which such a review could be made, then what is the effect of such review on the decision at which we had already arrived.

3. So far as the first point is concerned, Mr. Amin relied primarily on the provisions of Section 369, Code of Criminal Procedure. That section is in the following terms :

"Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other aw for the time being in force or, in the oase of a H. C. for a Part A State, by the Letters Patent or other instrument constituting such H. C., no Ct., when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error."

Mr. Amin, therefore, argued that so long as the judgment had not been sinned it was open to the Ct. to alter or review the same, that it is only after it has been signed that it cannot be altered or reviewed except to correct a clerical error. His submission was that as we had not signed the judgment, it was open to us to alter or review it, even though we had disposed of the appeal on September 13, a writ had already been issued in pursuance of the order made therein. In support of this contention, Mr. Amin relied on three judgments of the Allahabad H. C. in Queen-Empress v. Lalit Tiwari 21 ALL. 177 : (1899 A. w N. 15), Emperor v. Kallu, 27 ALL. 92 : (1 Cr. L. J. 710) Emperor v. Govind Sahai, 38 ALL. 184: (A. I. R. (3) 1916 ALL 183 : 17 Cr. L. J. 47). He also relied on the judgment of the Calcutta H. C. in Amodini Dasee v. Darsan Ghose, 38 Cal 828 : (13 Cr. L. J. 120) the judgment of the Patna H. C. in Mohan Singh v. Emperor, 23 Pat. 28 : (A. I. R. (31) 1944 pat 209 : 46 Cr. L. J. 30).

4. Section 369, Criminal P. C., as it stood prior to its being amended by Act XVIII [18] of 1923, ran as follows :

"No Ct., other than a High Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except as provided in Sections 395 424 or to correct a clerical error."

The use of the words "other than a H. C." admitted of an interpretation that the H. C. had unlimited powers of altering or reviewing its judgment even after it had been signed. This contention, however, was expressly negatived by several H. Cs. who held that the H. Cs. had no power of altering or reviewing their judgments except to correct a clerical error, no such power could be derived by implication