The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, was a valid law that fell outside the scope of Article 31(6) of the Constitution and was therefore not affected by the provisions of Article 31(2).

Headnote:
BOMBAY LAND REQUISITION ACT, 1948 - CONSTITUTIONALITY - ARTICLE 13, 19, 31 - SECTIONS 5, 6 - VALIDITY - REQUISITION OF PROPERTY - PUBLIC PURPOSE - REASONABLE RESTRICTION - NOTICE TO ADVOCATE-GENERAL - ORDER 27A, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.
Fact of the Case:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, particularly Sections 5 and 6, in light of the provisions of the Constitution of India, which came into force on January 26, 1950. The petitioner, a sub-tenant, alleged that the requisition of his premises under Section 6(4)(a) of the Act was void as it contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, was a valid law enacted by a competent Legislature prior to the 18-month limitation laid down in Article 31(6) of the Constitution. Therefore, it was not affected by the provisions of Article 13, even though it provided for requisition for a purpose other than a public purpose.
Issues: 1. Whether the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, dealing with requisition or taking possession of land or premises are void on 26-1-1960, upon the coming into force of the Const. of Ind.? 2. Whether the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, dealing with requisition or taking possession of land or premises are void on 26-1-1960, upon the coming into force of the Const. of Ind.? 3. Whether the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, dealing with requisition or taking possession of land or premises are void on 26-1-1960, upon the coming into force of the Const. of Ind.? 4. Whether the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, dealing with requisition or taking possession of land or premises are void on 26-1-1960, upon the coming into force of the Const. of Ind.? 5. Whether it is incumbent upon the Court to give notice to the Advocate-General in a petition involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, even though the State of Bombay is a party to the petition?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Article 31(2) of the Constitution places two limitations on the power of the State to acquire or take possession of any property: (a) it can only do so for a public purpose, and (b) it must provide compensation. 2. Article 31(5) provides that nothing in Clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of Clause (6) apply. 3. The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, was an existing law that fell outside the scope of Article 31(6) because it was enacted more than 18 months before the commencement of the Constitution. 4. Therefore, the Act was not affected by the provisions of Article 31(2) and remained a valid law even though it did not provide for requisition for a public purpose. 5. Order 27A, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code mandates the Court to give notice to the Advocate-General in every suit or proceeding involving a substantial question of law concerning the State, regardless of whether the State is a party to the suit or proceeding.
Final Decision: 1. The Court answered the first question in the negative, holding that the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, dealing with requisition or taking possession of land or premises were not void upon the coming into force of the Constitution of India. 2. The Court did not answer the remaining questions as they did not arise from the facts of the case. 3. The Court directed that the petition be sent back to Tendolkar J. for disposal in light of the judgment, including the issue of costs.

Judgment

Chagla, C.J.

1. A petn. was presented before Tendolkar J. by one Heman Santlal Alreja alleging that he was a sub-tenant of certain premises that Govt. on 29-5-1950, had issued an order under Section 6 (4) (a), Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, requisitioning the premises of which he was a sub-tenant, that the order passed by Govt. was void because according to him Section 6 (4) (a) of the Act was void as contravening the provisions of the Constitution. As the question raised was of considerable importance as several other petns. were pending before Tondolkar J. which raised the same question, Tendolker J. refd. the matter to a D. B. in doing so the learned Judge raised several questions for our decision. As we shall presently point out, we propose to decide only those questions which directly arise from the facts of this particular petn. It is always inadvisable to travel outside the facts of a particular case express hypothetical opinions which may only embarrass Judges who may have to consider cases in future which arise on different facts. This is particularly so when we are dealing with our Constitution which is a new enactment which always raises questions of great difficulty complexity.

2. It would first be necessary to consider the impugned provisions of the Act in question. The Act was passed on 11-4-1948, the object of the Act was to provide for the requisition of land, for the continuance of requisition of land, for certain other purposes. Section 5 gave power to the Govt. to requisition any land for any purpose the limitation on that power was that no building or part thereof wherein the owner, the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, has actually resided for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the order shall be requisitioned under this section, Section 6 provided for requisition of vacant premises it cast certain obligations upon the landlord to give intimation with regard to a vacancy. Sub-section (4) of Section 6 provided :

"Whether or not an intimation under Sub-section (1) is given notwithstanding anything contained in Section 5, the State Govt. may, by order in writing-

(a) requisition the premises may use or deal with the premises in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient; or

(b) require the landlord to let the premises to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstances."

3. Now as pointed out before, the order issued by Govt. is under Section 6 (4) (a) the order purports to requisition the premises in possession of the peter. The challenge made by the petnr. both to Section 6 Section 6 is that after the Constitution was enacted, viz. 26-1-1950, these sections became void under Article 13 of the Constitution inasmuch as they contained provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part in which deal with fundamental rights. It is not disputed that when the Act was passed in April, 1948, the Legislature that passed it had legislative competence the Act continued to be a valid Act all its provisions were valid until 26 1-1950, when by reason of the passing of the Constitution by reason of Article 13 of the Constitution certain provisions of the Act became void. What is contended on behalf of the petnr. is that Sections 5 6 give power to the Govt. to requisition property for any purpose, any provision of law which gives such power to the State is contrary to the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution. The right to property under the constitution is dealt with under Article 19 (1) (f) Articles 31 32. We had occasion to consider the scheme of these Articles in a recent judgment in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Mills, 53 Bom. L. R. 218 : (A. I. R. (38) 1951 Bom. 86) it is necessary perhaps briefly to recapitulate what we then held the view we took of these articles. Our view was that Article 31 (2) dealt with cases where ownership of property or possession of property passed

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