IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Dixit Y.V. , J.
Appellants: Nanalal Bhogilal and Anr.
Vs.
Respondent: Ambalal Somnath
Second Appeal No. 307 of 1950
Decided On: 24.01.1951
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: B.G. Thakor, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: D.V. Patel, Adv.
EXECUTION OF DECREE - JURISDICTION - CONSENT DECREE - SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGEE - JURISDICTION OF COURT TO PASS DECREE - EXECUTABILITY OF DECREE - Order 34, Rule 1, Civil P. C. - Section 7 (ix), Court-fees Act.
Fact of the Case:
A consent decree was passed in a mortgage suit in 1945. In 1948, the subsequent mortgagee filed an execution application to execute the decree. The executing Court dismissed the application on the ground that the decree was not executable. The District Court allowed the appeal of the subsequent mortgagee and directed the executing Court to proceed with the execution application. The mortgagors appealed to the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the trial Court had jurisdiction to pass the consent decree because the subsequent mortgagee was a necessary party to the suit and the three mortgages in his favor related to the same property. The Court also held that the decree was executable because the claim of the subsequent mortgagee related to the suit and was included in the consent decree.
Issues: 1. Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to pass the consent decree? 2. Whether the decree was executable?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The trial Court had jurisdiction to pass the consent decree because: a) The subsequent mortgagee was a necessary party to the suit under Order 34, Rule 1, Civil P. C. b) The three mortgages in his favor related to the same property. c) The valuation of the suit was based on the amount due on the plaintiff's prior mortgage, which was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The decree was executable because: a) The claim of the subsequent mortgagee related to the suit and was included in the consent decree. b) The expression "so far as it relates to the suit" is a wide expression and may include something which was extraneous to the suit.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
Dixit, J.
1. This is a second appeal in execution which raises an interesting question of jurisdiction.
2. The decree sought to be executed was passed on 5-10-1945. It was a decree by consent. The suit in which the decree was passed was suit No. 496 of 1942 filed by one Raval Goculeshwar Maganlal in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ahmedabad. The suit was to enforce a mortgage executed in his favour on 6-5-1932, by two defts., who are father son, who are appellants in the present appeal. In the suit was also another party as deft. 3, who is the respondent to the present appeal. Defts. 1 2 effected three mortgages, subsequent to the first mortgage in favour of deft. 3 those three mortgages are dated 16-12-1932, 27-11-1933 17- 5-1938. The mortgage in favour of the plff. was one in order to secure a sum of Rs. 1,200 the mortgages in favour of deft. 3 were respectively to secure Rs. 1,300, Rs. 1,500 Rs. 4,000. The mortgage in favour of the plff. was one with possession.
3. In the suit in question the plff. the defts came to an agreement or compromise the agreement was embodied in a decree. There are several parts of the decree which are set out in the appellate judgment. Nothing turns upon the terms of the decree, so that it is not necessary to refer to those terms in any detail in this place.
4. Briefly stated, the decree so far as it is relevant to the present appeal, is to the effect that defts. 1 2 were to pay deft. 3 a sum of Rs. 7000 in respect of his mortgage claims in the manner provided in the decree.
5. In the year 1948 deft. 3 filed darkhast No. 394 to execute the decree when he was met with the objection that the decree was not executable. This plea found favour with the executing Court in the result that Court disposed of the darkhast with coats on the D. H. From the order made by the executing Court deft. 3 preferred an appeal in the District Court, Ahmedabad the learned Joint Judge allowed the appeal of deft 3, reversed the order of the executing Court directed that Court to proceed with the execution application in accordance with law. From the appellate decree defts. 1 2 have come up in second appeal.
6. Upon this appeal Mr. B. G. Thakor for the appellants has taken up two points. In the first place, he contends that the consent decree passed on 5-10-1945, is one without jurisdiction, so that the executing Court cannot proceed to execute the decree. It is next contended that the relief which has been claimed by the respondent in the present darkhast did not relate to the suit that it was extraneous to the suit that the respondents remedy, if any, was to file a separate suit not to proceed by way of an execution application. Each of the two points, if correct, is sufficient to disentitle the respondent to the relief claimed by him. But I am not satisfied that either of the two contentions is well-founded.
7. Now, the principles as regards the powers of an executing Court are well settled. An executing Court cannot question the validity, legality or correctness of a decree. Its duty is to execute the decree except where it is shown that the Court passing a decree had no inherent jurisdiction to pass it. Bearing in mind these principles it is now necessary to turn to the circumstances in which the consent decree was passed. The suit filed by the original plff. was a suit to enforce a mortgage. To the suit he had joined not only the original mortgagors but also a subsequent mortgagee who is the present respondent. Under the provisions of Order 34, Rule 1, Civil P. C., all persons having an interest either in the mortgage-security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage. It cannot, therefore, be urged that deft. 3 should not have been joined as a party to the suit. The suit which the plff. filed was a suit to enforce the mortgage in his favour. The mortgage was executed in order to secure a sum of Rs. 1,200 the
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