Bavdekar, J.

1. His Lordship, after narrating facts and dealing with points not material to the report, proceeded :] The learned counsel, who appears on behalf of the appellants, contends, however, that Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, even after the amendment of the Act, by which cotton and certain other commodities were added to the definition of essential commodities in the Act, did not permit the Central Government to direct by an Order that there should be exercised by the Textile Commissioner control over the supply or the prices of lickerin wire. He says that the section merely permits the Central Government by a notified Order to regulate the production, distribution and supply of an essential commodity and trade and commerce therein. It does not permit directly control over the production, distribution and supply of commodities, which are not essential commodities, nor does it permit the regulation of the trade and commerce in such non-essential commodities. If we look at the section itself, it is obvious that the commodities, of which the production, distribution and supply is permitted to be regulated, are essential commodities; and similarly the commodities in which trade and commerce 13 permitted to be regulated are essential commodities. But even though that is what appears to be the prima facie meaning of the section, it is not contended on behalf of the State that, for certain reasons, which it would be convenient to state a little later if the Central Government found it necessary, in order to control supply and distribution of the essential commodities and trade and commerce therein, to control the production distribution and supply of the commodities, which are not essential, and trade and commerce in such commodities, Section 3 will permit the Central Government so to provide by a proper Order. The learned Government Pleader, who appears on behalf of the State, says that the words "regulating the production, distribution and supply of essential goods and trade and commerce therein" are very wide words, and in case they can be made to bear a wider interpretation, then there is no reason why a narrower interpretation should be placed upon them. Now, we quite understand that, in case we find that the words have got two meanings, one, a wider one and one, a narrower one, and it would be carrying out the intention of the Legislature, that is, to accept the wider meaning would assist in the removal of the mischief which the Act was enacted in order to obviate, then, we should accept the wider meaning rather than the narrower meaning. But if we look at the words themselves, we do not think that it can be said that the words are capable of bearing the interpretation which the learned Government Pleader states that they are. The words "regulating the production, distribution and Supply of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein" seem to us to be plain enough, and by no stretch of imagination can it be said that, when the powers of the Central Government are to regulate the production, distribution and supply of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein, nevertheless because it would assist in the regulation of the objects which the Legislature have in view to control the production, distribution and supply of non-essential commodities also, it would be permissible to interpret the words to mean to control the production, distribution or supply or trade and commerce of non-essential commodities. We think that the argument has merely got to be stated in order to make out that it is plainly unmaintainable. The learned counsel, who appears on behalf of the appellants, points out as against this that, when it was thought necessary to give powers to the Central Government by an Order for regulating the production, distribution and supply of cotton and trade and commerce therein, it was thought necessary to amend the definition of essential commodity and add t