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1950 Supreme(Bom) 73

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
FULL BENCH
Before:
Chagla, C.J., Gajendragadkar P.B. and Tendolkar, JJ.
Appellants: Sakarchand Satidas and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Narayan Savla Vani and Ors.
First Appeal No. 375 of 1947
Decided On: 22.08.1950
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: S.A. Merchant, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: G.M. Joshi, Adv. for Respondents 1 to 4

The share of the alienee in an alienation of joint family property by a father is determined at the date of alienation and not at partition.

Headnote:

HINDU LAW - ALIENATION BY FATHER - SHARE OF ALIENEE - DETERMINED AT DATE OF ALIENATION - NOT AT PARTITION.

Fact of the Case:

A father, defendant 6, mortgaged joint family property in 1932 to defendants 1-5. Plaintiffs 1-3, sons of defendant 6, and plaintiff 4, his wife, challenged the alienation, claiming that the property was joint family property and that the mortgage was not binding on their shares. The trial court upheld the challenge and declared that the mortgage was not binding on the plaintiffs' share, which it assessed at four-fifths.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the alienation was not justified by legal necessity or benefit to the joint family property. It also held that the suit was not barred by limitation, as the cause of action accrued only when the mortgagees sued to enforce the mortgage.

Issues: 1. Whether the property alienated was joint family property. 2. Whether the alienation was justified by legal necessity or benefit to the joint family property. 3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation. 4. What is the share in the property to which the plaintiffs are entitled.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the property alienated was joint family property, as the defendants did not controvert the plaintiffs' allegation in their plaint that the property was joint family property. 2. The court held that the alienation was not justified by legal necessity or benefit to the joint family property, as the mortgage deed recited that the sum of Rs. 7000 was borrowed by defendant 6 to take over the havala of Rs. 7000 due from the shop of one Dhondu to the mortgagee, and Dhondu testified that defendant 6 did not receive any benefit whatsoever either to himself or to the family by taking over this havala. 3. The court held that the suit was not barred by limitation, as the cause of action accrued only when the mortgagees sued to enforce the mortgage, and that limitation began to run from that date. 4. The court held that the share in the property to which the plaintiffs are entitled is one-half, as the share of the alienee is determined at the date of alienation and not at partition.

Final Decision: The court answered the question submitted to it that the share in the property to which the plaintiffs are entitled is one-half.

Judgment

Chagla C.J.

1. In the suit from which this appeal arises, an alienation made by defendant 6, who is the father of plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 and the husband of plaintiff 4, was challenged. The alienation was a mortgage dated 6-6-1932, and the alienation was in favour of defendants 1 to 5. The trial Court upheld the challenge and declared that the mortgage was not binding upon the plaintiffs share which he assessed at four-fifths.

2. In this appeal Mr. Merchant on behalf of the alienees has first contended that there is no evidence which would justify a finding that the property alienated was joint family property. The plaintiffs came to Court on the allegation in their plaint that the property was joint family property and that allegation was met by defendants 1 to 5 by the assertion that the property was alienated by defendant 6 for legal necessity. Defendants 1 to 5 in their written statement did not controvert the allegation of the plaintiffs that the property was joint family property. In view of that state of the pleadings, in our opinion, it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to prove at the trial that the property was joint family property. That allegation must be deemed to have been admitted and on that admission the Court was entitled to proceed on the basis that the property it was considering was joint family property.

3. On the merits of the allegation very little can be said. The mortgage deed recites that the sum of Rs. 7000 was borrowed by defendant 6, on the mortgage of the property because he had taken over the havala of Rs. 7000 due from the shop of one Dhondu to the mortgagee. Dhondu has given evidence in the case and he has pointed out that defendant 6 did not receive any benefit whatsoever either to himself or to the family by taking over this havala. He says that the shop could not pay the sum of Rs. 7000 to the mortgagee, and thereupon defendant 6, like a good Samaritan stepped in and took over the havala and passed a mortgage in favour of the mortgagee. This alienation, therefore, cannot be justified either by legal necessity or benefit to the joint family property.

4. The third point urged by Mr. Merchant is that the suit is barred by limitation. Mr. Merchants contention is that the suit falls under Article 120. In this case the plaintiffs are not merely asking for a declaration, but are also asking for possession. But even assuming that the suit fell under Article 120, the cause of action would only accrue when there was an invasion of the plaintiffs right or unequivocal threat to their rights. The learned trial Judge has rightly pointed out that the mortgage was a simple mortgage, that the mortgagee never went into possession, and that a danger to the interest of the plaintiffs only arose when defendants 1 to 5, sued to enforce the mortgage. It is from that date that limitation began to run, and if that is the correct starting point of limitation, then the suit is clearly in time.

5. The final contention urged by Mr. Merchant is that the trial Court was in error in deciding that the only share of the property which defendant 6 was entitled to alienate was one-fifth and that the four-fifths share was protected. This contention raises a very interesting question. There arc two clear views on this question and I will briefly state these two views. The one view for which Mr. Merchant contends is that in order to determine the alienees share the material date is the date of alienation, and in order to determine that share you have to consider what would be the fathers share if there had been a partition on that date. In this case plaintiffs l and 2 were in existence at the date of the alienation. Plaintiff 3 was subsequently born. Therefore, if a partition had taken place at the date of the alienation, the two sons would have one-fourth share each, the wife would have one-fourth share, and the father would have one-fourth share. The father would not be entitled to alienate the share of his two sons who wer









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