IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Chagla, C.J. and Tendolkar, J.
Appellants: State of Bombay
Vs.
Respondent: Mohanlal Kapur
O.C.J. Appeal No. 31 of 1951
Decided On: 18.04.1951
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: H.M. Seervai and R.J. Joshi, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: N.A. Palkhivala, Adv.
LAND REQUISITION - BOMBAY LAND REQUISITION ACT, 1948 - SECTION 6(4) - REQUISITION ORDER - PURPOSE OF REQUISITION - MUST BE STATED IN ORDER - ORDER INVALID IF PURPOSE NOT STATED.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged an order of requisition issued by the Government of Bombay under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, on the ground that the order did not state the purpose for which the premises were being requisitioned.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the order was invalid because it did not state the purpose for which the premises were being requisitioned. The court held that the purpose of the requisition must be stated in the order because it is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to requisition.
Issues: Whether the order of requisition was valid.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the order of requisition was invalid because it did not state the purpose for which the premises were being requisitioned. The court held that the purpose of the requisition must be stated in the order because it is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to requisition.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
Chagla, C.J.
1. An order of requisition dated December 12, 1950, was challenged by the petitioner, and the learned Judge below Mr. Justice Shah held that the order was bad on the ground that the order did not recite that the requisition was for the purpose of the State or for other public purpose. The order in question is to the following effect :
"WHEREAS, on inquiry it ii found that the premises specified below had become vacant on or after the month of April 1950.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, the Government of Bombay is pleased to requisition the said premises." Then follows a description of the premises.
2. Now, Mr. Seervais first contention is that the law does not require that the order should state the purpose for which the premises are requisitioned. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to look at the language of Section 6 (4) as amended. That section provides:
Whether or not an intimation under Sub-section (1) is given and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 5, the State Government may, by order in writing.
(a) requisition the premises for the purpose of the of the State or any other public purpose and may use or deal with the premises for any such purpose in such manner as it may appear to it to be expedient."
It is clear, and Mr. Seervai does not dispute it, that the very foundation of the power of the State to requisition premises is the existence of a purpose of the State or any other public surpose. It is also beyond dispute that the purpose of the State or any other public purpose is not a purpose which in the opinion of the State satisfies the qualifications laid down in the statute. Whether a particular purpose is a purpose of the State or any other public purpose is a justiciable issue and the Court may investigate into the purpose for which the State has requisitioned a particular property. If the Court is satisfied that the purpose for which the requisition was made was not a purpose of the State or any other public purpose, then it would be open to the Court to say that the order was made without the condition precedent being satisfied. It is also clear that before an order of requisition can be made, the requisitioning authority must have determined for itself what the purpose of the State of other public purpose is for which the requisition order is being made. It is not open to the requisitioning authority to make up its mind as to why it wants to requisition the premises or what use it wants to put those premises after the requisition is made. The condition precedent and the foundation of the exercise of the power must be present in the mind of the requisitioning authority before it issues the order by which it takes away the property of the subject. Now, on the question as to whether the order in writing contemplated by Section 6 (4) requires the purpose for which the property is being requisitioned to be stated or not depends upon the construction of the sub-clause. What the order in writing is to be is stated in Section 6 (4) (a), and Seervais contention is that all that the order in writing requires is the statement that the premises are being requisitioned, or, in other words, Mr. Seervai suggests that the order in writing only qualifies "requisition the premises" and not the phrase that occurs after the word "premises". There is no reason why looking to the place of the expression "order in writing" in Section 6 (4) and looking to the language of Clause (a), we should hold that the "order in writing" only qualifies "requisition the premises" and not the whole expression requisition the premises for the purpose of the State and any other public purpose." It is clear to my mind that the order in writing qualifies the whole expression up to "public purpose" from the fact that when the Legislature did not intend that expression to qualify any subsequent words the
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