Article 14 of the Constitution applies to laws and not to administrative orders. An officer's unfair or unequal exercise of discretion is considered a violation of the law rather than a contravention of Article 14.

Headnote:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ARTICLE 14 - DISCRIMINATION - ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS - COTTON CONTROL ORDER, 1949 - IMPORT TRADE CONTROL ORDER, 1948 - COTTON IMPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE - DISCRETION OF OFFICER - MALA FIDE EXERCISE - WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, Dhanraj Mills, challenged the allocation of imported cotton varieties, Kampala and Tanganyika, by the Deputy Chief Controller, alleging unfair discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner claimed entitlement to a specific quantity of cotton based on past consumption and argued that the allocation process was influenced by the Indian Cotton Import Advisory Committee, favoring Kampala cotton consumers.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the allocation of imported cotton was not governed by the Cotton Control Order, 1949, as argued by the petitioner, but by the Import Trade Control Order, 1948. Under this order, the Deputy Chief Controller issued licenses to importers, who were required to sell the cotton to mills as directed by the Deputy Chief Controller. The petitioner's allocation was determined based on his requirements and the availability of cotton from license holders.
Issues: 1. Whether the allocation of imported cotton was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. 2. Whether the Deputy Chief Controller had a statutory obligation to allocate cotton to the petitioner under the Cotton Control Order, 1949. 3. Whether the petitioner had a right to insist on obtaining a specific quantity of cotton.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination and ensures equal protection of the laws to all persons. However, the court held that Article 14 applies to laws and not to administrative orders. Even if an officer exercises discretion unfairly or unequally, it is considered a violation of the law rather than a contravention of Article 14. 2. The court found that the Cotton Control Order, 1949, did not impose a statutory obligation on the Textile Commissioner to allocate cotton to the petitioner. The allocation process was carried out under the Import Trade Control Order, 1948, which gave the Deputy Chief Controller the discretion to allocate cotton based on the requirements of different mills. 3. The petitioner did not have a right to insist on obtaining a specific quantity of cotton. The allocation was based on the petitioner's requirements and the availability of cotton from license holders.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish discrimination or a violation of Article 14. The court also found that the Deputy Chief Controller had the discretion to allocate cotton and that the petitioner did not have a right to insist on a specific quantity.

Judgment

Chagla, C.J.

1. The petition from which this appeal arises is an entirely hopeless one Mr. Pritt with all his ingenuity has tried to make it as presentable as possible. The petitioners are the Dhanraj Mills they used in their mills imported foreign cotton of two varieties, Kampala Tan-ganyika. A control has been imposed by the Govt. of India on the sale of cotton mills can only receive cotton as permitted by the various Control Orders issued from time to time by the Govt. of India. The grievance made by the petitioner in his petition is that he was allocated by resp. I who is the Deputy Chief Controller, certain bales of cotton of the Kampala Tanganyika varieties for the yeara 1948-1949. This allocation was made on the hasis of the consumption of the mills of this cotton for a period of three years ending with December 1942. The petitioner applied for allocation of these two varieties of cotton to resp. l also for the years 1949-1950 , without going into figures, broadly the petitioners contention is that he has been allocated cotton of the Kampala Tanganyika varieties which is less than what he applied for to which he was entitled. His further contention is that resp. 1 reserved for the use of the Govt. of India more cotton of the Tanganyika variety than of the Kampala variety. As it happens, the petitioner used more cotton of the Tanganyika variety than of the Kampala variety and, therefore, his share of the Tanganyika cotton was less than what he applied for. His further grievance is that even with regard to the Tanganyika variety he has received less than he was entitled to according to his quota, even on the assumption that the reservation made of the Tanganyika variety by resp. 1 was a proper reservation. He has also made an allegation, not very clearly, nor very explicitly, but still the suggestion is there that resp. 1 has been advised in making the allocation by a committee called the Indian Cotton Import Advisory Commitee the majority of the members of this Committee are consumers of Kampala cotton therefore, it was to their advantage that there should be more reservation of the Tanganyika variety rather than of the Kampala variety. On these facts the petitioner asked for a writ in the nature of mandamus against the resps. in the alternative any appropriate order or direction under Art, 226 of the Constitution.

2. Mr. Pritt, who opened the appeal before us, argued it on the assumption that all the facts pleaded in the petition had been established. We asked him to argue as if he was arguing on a demurrer because we felt that it would be difficult for Mr. Pritt to substantiate his case that even if all the facts alleged by him had been established he was entitled to any relief on this petition. In opening the appeal Mr. Pritt drew our attention to the Cotten Control Order of 1949 issued by the Central Govt. in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Section 3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946, he relied on Clause 14 of that Order which provides that the Textile Commissioner may, with a view to securing a proper distribution of cotton or with a view to securing compliance with this Order, direct any person holding a stock of cotton or any class of such persons to sell to such person or persons such quantities of such description of cotton as the Textile Commissioner may specify, the rather seemingly attractive argument advanced by Mr. Pritt was that the expression "may" in Clause 14 should be read as "must", that there was a statutory obligation upon the Textile Commissioner to allocate to the petitioner certain bails of cotton according to his requirements, the Textile Commissioner having failed to discharge his statutory obligation, the Court was entitled to issue a writ of mandamus against the Textile Commissioner ordering him to allocate certain bales of cotton to the petitioner. In the alternative Mr. Pritt contended that even if no obligation could be spelt ou

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