The Court held that the Legislature had legislative competence to enact the Ordinance and the Act, as the subject matter fell within the Concurrent List of the Constitution and the legislation was necessary to deal with the aftermath of partition. The Court also held that the Ordinance and the Act did not violate any fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, as the restrictions imposed on the rights of evacuees were reasonable and necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives of the legislation.

Chagla, C.J.

1. This appeal arises out of a petition filed to challenge certain orders passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The facts briefly stated leading up to the petition are that the second petitioner, which is a limited company, was incorporated on 14th July 1933, as a private limited company with a share capital divided into 44,149 shares. The number of share-holders was 35 and the first petitioner is a share holder of this limited company with a holding of 2,715 shares. On 7-10-1949 two notifications were issued by the Deputy Custodian of Bombay, one under Section 4 (2) of Bombay Act XXIV [24] of 1949 vesting the property of the second petitioner company in the Custodian, and the second notification under Section 6(1) of 6he same Act dealing with the possession and control of that property. On 14th October 1949, two notifications were issued by the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property of Thana, one again under Section 4 (2) and the other under Section 6 (1) also relating to the property of the second petitioner. On 6th December 1949, the second petitioner appealed to the Additional Custodian under Section 24 of Ordinance No. XXVII [27] of 1949 which had replaced the Bombay Act on 18th October 1949. This appeal was heard by the Custodian on 2nd March 1950, and on 3rd March 1950, the Custodian directed that notices be issued to the shareholders of the second petitioner company. These notices were issued in exercise of the powers of revision conferred upon the Custodian under Section 26 (1) of Ordinance No. XXVII [27] of 1949. These notices called upon the shareholders to show cause why orders should not be passed declaring them evacuees under Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 2 (d) of the Ordinance and all their property be declared evacuee property. On 28th March 1950, an order was passed by the Custodian on the appeal preferred by the company holding that the orders of the Custodian and the Deputy Custodian were bad and those orders were set aside. On 28th March 1950, a notification was issued by the Custodian under Section 7 (3) of the Ordinance and by this notification the Custodian notified the evacuee properties specified in the schedule as having vested in him under that section, and the properties notified were the shares of all the 35 shareholders of the company including obviously the shares of the first petitioner. On 4th April 1950, the Custodian issued a requisition under Section 10 (2) (1) of the Act upon the directors of the company requesting them to call an extraordinary general meeting of the company under Article 40 of the articles of association to consider a special resolution which the Custodian proposed to move at that meeting. By the petition the petitioners challenged the notification issued by the Custodian vesting the shares of the share-holders in the Custodian and also the requisition issued by the Custodian under Section 10(2) (1) of the Act. The petition came before Shah J. who dismissed the petition. Before us the orders passed by the Custodian have been challenged on various grounds. In the first place, it is contended that the orders were issued under a piece of legislation which was passed by the Legislature without having legislative competence. The orders are also challenged on the ground that the legislation in question is unconstitutional as violating the fundamental rights guaranteed to the subject by our Constitution. The orders are further challenged on the ground that they are in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon the Custodian and also as violating the fundamental principles of natural justice.

2. Before these points can be considered, it is necessary to look at the scheme of the Ordinance under which the orders challenged were issued. We are not concerned in this appeal with the Bombay Act because the orders issued by the Custodian and the Deputy Custodian against the second petitioner were held to be bad by the Custodian himself. The orders now challen