IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
FULL BENCH
Chagla, C.J., Bavdekar and Shah J.C. , JJ.
Appellants: In Re: Keshav Madhav Menon
Vs.
Respondent:
Criminal Appln. No. 229 of 1950
Decided On: 12.04.1950
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: L.M. Jhaveri and H.S. Bhat, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: C.K. Daphatary, Adv. General and B.G. Thakor, Addl. Asst. Govt. Pleader
{'KEYWORD': 'Constitutionality of Legislation', 'SUBJECT': 'Validity of Section 18(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 in light of Article 13(1) of the Constitution', 'ACT SECTION LIST': ['Article 13(1) of the Constitution', 'Article 228 of the Constitution', 'Article 251 of the Constitution', 'Article 254 of the Constitution', 'Article 367 of the Constitution', 'Article 372 of the Constitution', 'Article 395 of the Constitution', 'Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897', 'Section 18(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931', 'Section 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889']}
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was being prosecuted for contravening Section 18(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which was alleged to have occurred before the Constitution came into force. The petitioner challenged the validity of Section 18(1) on the grounds that it contravened Article 19 of the Constitution.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that Section 18(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 was void and of no effect as it contravened Article 19 of the Constitution. However, the court also held that the prosecution against the petitioner could still proceed as the proceedings were initiated before the Constitution came into force and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 saved the pending proceedings from being affected by the voiding of the Act.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 18(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 contravened Article 19 of the Constitution. 2. Whether the prosecution against the petitioner could proceed despite Section 18(1) being declared void.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Article 13(1) of the Constitution and held that laws that are inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution are void to the extent of such inconsistency. 2. The court interpreted Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held that it applies to laws that have become void due to inconsistency with the Constitution, and that it saves vested rights and pending proceedings from being affected by the voiding of the law. 3. The court distinguished between the effect of repealing a law and declaring it void, holding that both have the same effect of annulling the law.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed as the court held that the prosecution against the petitioner could still proceed despite Section 18(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 being declared void.
Chagla, C.J.
1. The petitioner is being prosecuted before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate for having contravened Section 18 (1), Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and the application of the petitioner is that the prosecution should be quashed inasmuch as Section 18 (1), Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, is void and of no effect as contravening Article 19 of the Constitution.
2. Now, before we consider whether Section 18 (1) contravenes a fundamental right which has been granted to the subjects under our Constitution, we have to decide whether we have any jurisdiction at this stage to consider this matter when the case is still pending before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate. Reliance is placed by the petitioner upon Article 228 of the Constitution, and that article provides :
"If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a Court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it shall withdraw the case and shall deal with it as laid down in that article," and the submission made to us by the Advocate General is that the case pending before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate does not involve any question as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Turning to Article 13 (1), it lays down that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. Now, the offence was alleged to have been committed in this case before the Constitution came into force and the prosecution was also launched by the Government before the Constitution came into force Therefore, on the date when the Constitution came into force, the prosecution against the petitioner was pending before a criminal Court, and the question that we have to consider is, assuming that Section 18 of the Press Act is void, whether a proceeding which was pending under that section of the Act prior to the commencement of the Constitution is affected by the section being void as a result of the coming into force of the Constitution, The contention of Mr. Jhaveri is that inasmuch as the Act is declared to be void being inconsistent with the provisions of part III of the Constitution, all proceedings which were taken under that Act, all rights which have accrued and of liabilities that have been incurred, must automatically come to an end along with the Act becoming void on the coming into force of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Advocate-Generals contention is that Article 13 (1) does not affect either vested rights or liabilities that have been incurred or proceedings that have been taken under a law which was valid prior to the commencement of the Constitution These are the two rival contentions which we have to consider.
3. Now, when an Act is repealed and ceases to be of any effect, ordinarily the vested rights which have come into existence under the repealed Act and anything done or any proceedings taken come to an end with the repeal of the statute. In order to save vested rights and in order not to affect what was done under an Act, in England Section 33 (2), Interpretation Act, 1889, was enacted which expressly saved the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it and any legal proceeding which wag pending under the Act. Similarly, in India we have Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897, which is practically identical in terms of the section I have just referred to of the Interpretation Act, and that section provides that where this Act or any regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different Intention appears, the repeal shall not affect various vested rights and proceedings which are set out in detail in the v
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