Chagla, C.J.

[1] This is an appeal from an order made by Shah J. on an application for a writ of certiorari against the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the application came to be made under the following circumstances. There was a dispute between the Madras Electric Tramways Co., Ltd., who is the appellant before us and the petitioner who is an employee and other employees as to an order of dismissal passed by the Madras Electric Tramways Co. on 10-4-1950, which was confirmed by it on 22-5-1950. The contention of the petitioner and other employees was that they had been wrongly dismissed, the contention of the company being that their action was proper. It is unnecessary to go into the merits of that dispute. On 20-9-1950, the Madras Government by a notification issued under Section 10 (1) (e), Industrial Disputes Act referred this dispute to the Labour Tribunal and the Labour Tribunal gave its decision on 9-12-1950, by which it ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner. There was an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and on 4-6-1951, the Labour Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal. It was against this order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Shah J. took the view that the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was without jurisdiction, quashed the order, and granted the prayer sought by the petitioner. It is from that order of Shah J. that the company has come in appeal before us.

[2] Sir Jamshedji has raised a question in limine which was not urged before the Court below, and in our opinion that point must prevail in favour of the appellant, and the point urged is that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ in this matter. The jurisdiction of the Court was sought on the ground that the office of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is in Bombay. This is an all-India Tribunal acting as an appellate authority from the decisions of various Labour Tribunals all over the country. Although its office is situated in Bombay it also sits at other places in India like Madras, Calcutta and Allahabad, and the contention of the petitioner is that inasmuch as this judicial authority has passed an order without jurisdiction it is competent to the petitioner to come to this Court for a writ for quashing that order. On the other hand it must be observed that both the Madras Electric Co. and the petitioner are not within the jurisdiction of this Court. The subject-matter of the dispute between the company and its employee is also not within the jurisdiction of this Court, and the award made by the Labour Tribunal of Madras is also not capable of being corrected or modified by any order of this Court. The question that arises for our determination is whether the mere fact that the Labour Appellate Tribunal has its office in Bombay is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court to issue a writ of certiorari. It is pointed out that after our Constitution came into force the power of this Court to issue writs has been enhanced and Article 226 confers the power upon every High Court to issue writs throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Therefore, it will be noticed that Article 226, while conferring the power upon the High Court to issue writs, qualifies that power by limiting its exercise to the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Now, the High Court ordinarily exercises territorial jurisdiction when the subject-matter is situated within its jurisdiction or the parties reside within it. Therefore, although we now have the power to issue a writ of certiorari not only within the town and island of Bombay but through out the territory of the State, that power can only be exercised provided we have jurisdiction either in respect of the subject-matter or in respect of parties. Mr. Sule contends that as the Tribunal is situated in Bombay we have the power under Article 226 to correct its order. It is a