Gajendragadkar, J.

[1] The principal question which arises for our determination in this appeal at this stage relates to the quantum of the plaintiffs share in the properties in suit. This question has been raised in circumstances and on facts which make it necessary to examine some provisions of the Hindu law of adoption, and it is the consideration of these provisions which has made-this question both interesting and important. The-facts which give rise to the dispute are not many and most of them are true to the usual pattern of adoption cases.

[2] One Shrinivas had two sons, Ramchandra and Krishnaji. Krishnaji died in 1930. After his death Shrinivas and Ramchandra continued to live as members of an undivided Hindu family. In about December 1932 Krishnajis widow Sundrabai began to think of making an adoption to her deceased husband and it would appear that both Shrinivas And Ramchandra came to know about this intention of Sundrabai. Thereupon Shrinivas and Ramchandra effected a partition between themselves on 9-12-1932. This was followed by a registered deed of partition executed on 1G-12-1932. On this day itself Sundrabai adopted Ramkrishna, who is the plaintiff before us. Shrinivas then proceeded to alienate the properties which had fallen to his share by executing two deeds of gift in favour of Ramchandras sons Annaji and Dattatraya, and a will in favour of Ramchandras daughter Renukabai. On 13-12-1934, Shrinivas died, and on 10-1 -1936, the plaintiff brought the present suit in which he claimed to recover his half share in the properties of the family. To this suit be impleaded his own adoptive mother, defendant 1, and Ramchandra, his two sons and his daughter as defendants 2 to 5 respectively. The plaintiffs case was that the partition effected by Shrinivas and Ramchandra between themselves was intendedsolely to defeat his claims as an adopted son and that in fact the said partition had taken place not on 9th December but after his adoption on 16-12 1932. According to the plaintiff the family of the parties continued to be joint on the date of his suit and he wanted his half share in the properties on that footing.

[3] The defence naturally was that the adoption itself was invalid having taken place after the partition and that in any case the adopted son was not entitled to claim any share because the coparcenary between Shrinivas and Ramchandra had been terminated by a prior partition between them. The donees under Shrinivas made an additional plea that some of the properties which had been gifted to them and which the plaintiff had put in his suit were the separate properties of Shrinivas and the plaintiff was not entitled to make any claim in regard to them.

[4] The learned trial Judge found that the plain-tiffs adoption was valid and that the partition on which the defence was substantially based had taken place after the plaintiffs adoption. He, therefore, decreed the plaintiffs claim for a half share in the properties except those which in his opinion were not liable to be partitioned. In regard to the additional defence raised by the donees as to some of the properties in suit on the ground that they were the separate properties of Shrinivas and had been validly gifted to them, the learned Judge partly rejected that ground and held that properties Nos. 14, 15 and 16 in schedule A and the structures on properties Nos. 1 to 4 and 7 in Schedule B formed part of the estate belonging to the joint family and as such the plaintiff was entitled to his half share in them. This judgment of the trial Court was delivered on 22-7-1940.

[5] The defendants challenged this decree by their appeal preferred to this Court and their appeal substantially succeeded. It was held by Divatia and Macklin JJ. that the partition pleaded by the defendants had in fact been effected on 9-12-1932, with the result that though the plaintiffs adoption may be valid he was not entitled to challenge the said partition. On this view the plaintiff