Chagla, C.J.

[1] The petitioners who are the appellants before us challenge an order of requisition made by the State of Bombay on 24-3-1951.

[2] The order was made under Section 6, Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, and it contained a declaration that the premises had become vacant on or after the month of May 1950. The order did not state on the face of it the purpose for which the premises were requisitioned. A supplemental order was made by the State on 22-8-1951:, and that order stated that the premises were requisitioned for a public purpose, and the public purpose was; "housing a person without accommodation."

[3] Act XL of 1951 was enacted in November 1951 and that Act validated orders passed previously, if in fact the premises were requisitioned ton a public purpose; and in this case Government, relying on the Amending Act, sought to establish in the Court below that in fact the premises were requisitioned for a public purpose; and the question that arises for our determination is whether those promises were in fact requisitioned for a public purpose. The learned Judge below has taken the view that the premises were requisitioned for a public purpose and has, therefore, dismissed the petition. It is from that order of dismissal that this appeal is preferred.

[4] Now, the "public purpose" has been set out in full detail in the affidavits made by the State on this petition, and that purpose may be stated as fairly as it is possible, and the purpose is that inasmuch as there is a considerable scarcity of housing accommodation in the city of Bombay, it is necessary to regulate distribution of premises which "fall vacant, and that distribution should be brought about on an equitable basis. Therefore, the object and purpose of the Government was to distribute equitably premises which fell vacant and in respect of which intimation was given by the landlords as required by the Land Requisition Act.

[5] Now, "public purpose" has been defined by the Privy Council accepting the definition given by Batchelor J. which is to be found in Hamabai Framji v. Secretary of State, 17 Bom. l. r. 100 (P. C.) and from that definition it is clear that that purpose only is a public purpose which has for its primary object the general interest of the community. It may be that in achieving the public purpose an individual or individuals may be benefited, but the benefit to the individual or individuals must be indirect. The object to be aimed at must be the general interest of the community. It is also well settled, and indeed it must be so, that Government must be prima facie the best judges of what public interest is. Courts of law are far removed from the heat and dust of every day administration, and it is for the Government to administer the State, and they must be in the best position to decide how that administration should be carried on, and therefore Courts of law would ordinarily be most reluctant to take a different view of what public interest is from the view taken by the State. But when the Court is satisfied that the view taken by Government is capricious or arbitrary or when that view has been arrived at on an entirely unreasonable basis, the Court has ample jurisdiction to interfere and to come to the conclusion that the purpose for which the premises were requisitioned was not a public purpose. Now, we do not think that there can be any dispute that housing the homeless is a public purpose. Indeed in the situation in which our country is placed to-day there could not be a more laudable purpose, a more deserving purpose, than to find shelter for people who are without any shelter. It may be very important to house Government servants and those who are engaged in the service of the State. But it is equally important to see that the members of the public are also given reasonable accommodation so that they could feel certain that they have a roof over their heads. It is necessary to emphasise the fact that Government itself rea