IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Chagla, C.J. and N.H. Bhagwati, J.
Appellants: Sarupsingh Mangat Singh
Vs.
Respondent: Nilkant Bhaskar Suratkar
Appeal No. 80 of 1951
Decided On: 18.03.1952
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 96 - INSURANCE COMPANY'S LIABILITY - NOTICE TO INSURANCE COMPANY - REASONABLE NOTICE - INHERENT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE EX PARTE DECREE - INSURANCE COMPANY'S CONDUCT - SUMMARY
Fact of the Case:
In a running down action, an ex parte decree was passed against the defendant due to his absence. The insurance company, which was liable to pay the judgment amount as per Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, received notice of the proceedings only six days before the hearing. The insurance company filed a motion to set aside the ex parte decree, arguing that it did not have sufficient time to prepare a defense.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the insurance company could not be added as a party to the suit under Order 1, Rule 10, as it was not a necessary or proper party. The court also noted that the insurance company had knowledge of the suit since October 1947 and had taken steps to engage solicitors in December 1947, but failed to take any further action until after the ex parte decree was passed.
Issues: 1. Whether the insurance company could be made a party to the suit under Order 1, Rule 10? 2. Whether the insurance company had sufficient cause to set aside the ex parte decree? 3. Whether the court had inherent jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree in the interest of justice?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the insurance company could not be made a party to the suit under Order 1, Rule 10, as it was not a necessary or proper party. The plaintiff was not seeking any relief against the insurance company, and the insurance company's liability would arise by statute, not by any order of the court. 2. The court held that the insurance company did not have sufficient cause to set aside the ex parte decree. The insurance company had knowledge of the suit since October 1947 and had taken steps to engage solicitors in December 1947, but failed to take any further action until after the ex parte decree was passed. 3. The court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree in the interest of justice. However, the court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in this case because the insurance company had come to court with unclean hands by making a false statement to the plaintiff's attorneys.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the insurance company's appeal and upheld the ex parte decree.
Chagla, C.J.
1. This is an appeal from an order of TENDOLKAR, J., who refused to set aside an ex parte decree passed against the defendant. The decree was passed in a running down action. The suit was field on 14th October, 1947, and the summons was served upon the defendant by substituted service on 6th December, 1947. Messrs. Mulla Mulla filed their appearance on behalf of the defendant, but no written statement was filed and the suit appeared before the learned Judge for hearing on 27th June, 1951, and as the defendant was absent, an ex parte decree was passed. A motion was taken out by the defendant on 26th July, 1951, to set aside this ex parte decree, and as mentioned before the learned Judge dismissed the motion.
2. Now, dealing first with the narrow question as to whether there was any sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the defendant on 27th June, 1951, we entirely agree with the view taken by the learned Judge below that there was not sufficient cause. Although Messrs. Mulla Mulla were on the record, no written statement was filed and no proceedings were taken in the action by the defendant. Messrs. Mulla Mulla were not even instructed to apply for an adjournment on 27th June, 1951. The defendant was suggested that he was a displaced person, that he had to go from India to Pakistan from time to time in order to liquidate certain of his properties, and that thereafter he was in Nandurbar plying a motor lorry. But, as the learned Judge has pointed out, all this did not prevent him from keeping in touch with the suit of which he had notice and with regard to which he had actually instructed solicitors who were to act for him in that suit. The position might have been different if the defendant was unrepresented, but as he was represented, the failure on the part of the defendant to give proper instructions to his solicitors cannot possibly constitute a sufficient cause for his absence on 27th June, 1951.
3. But a more important and more interesting question has been raised by Mr. Maneckshaw. In this case an insurance company by the name of the Unique Motor and General Insurance Co., is concerned. The Motor Vehicles Act casts a liability upon an insurance company which insures a motor vehicle and issues a certificate of insurance to the owner of the motor vehicles. The liability is cast under Section 96 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the liability is that the insurer shall pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. Now, before this liability can be imposed upon the insurance company a condition precedent has got to be satisfied, and that condition precedent is referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 96, and the condition precedent is :
"No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the court of the bringing of the proceedings."
4. This notice was served by the plaintiff upon the insurance company on 21st June, 1951. Mr. Maneckshaws contention is that although the defendant might not have been able to show sufficient cause for his absence on 27th June, 1951, there is sufficient cause as far as the insurance company is concerned why it was not in a position to defend the action through the defendant on 27th June, 1951. Mr. Maneckshaw says that the notice was served only on 21st June, 1951, and the insurance company had only six days time to prepare for the defence, and according to Mr. Maneckshaw this was not reasonable notice given to the insurance company and therefore the ex parte decree should be set aside in order to give an opportunit
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