Chagla, C.J.

[1] This is an appeal from an order of Shah J. by which he directed a writ of certiorari to issue against the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

[2] There was a dispute between the workers of the Elephant Oil Mills, Ltd., and the mills and this dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, and the Tribunal made its award on 19-10-1950. There was an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal gave its award on 8-2-1951, and the appellant before us, who is a worker of the mills, preferred this petition to this Court alleging that no notice of appeal had been served upon him, that he had not been heard by the Appellate Tribunal, that there was a violation of the rules of natural justice, and therefore, the award of the Appellate Tribunal should be quashed.

[3] The learned Judge below upheld the contention of the appellant. He held that he had not been heard by the Appellate Tribunal, and the order that he made was that the award of the Appellate Tribunal in so far as it modifies the award to the prejudice to the petitioner be vacated, and he further directed that the Appellate Tribunal do hear the appeal against the petitioner after giving him adequate notice of the date of the hearing of the appeal.

[4] Now, the order is challenged by the appellant on two grounds. One is that the learned Judge should not have set aside the award only to the extent that it affected the appellant but should have quashed the award as a whole, and the other ground on which the order of the learned Judge is challenged is that the learned Judge was in error in directing the Appellate Tribunal to hear the appeal against the petitioner.

[5] Now, turning to the first ground, Mr. Vimadalal has contended that there is nothing to prevent this Court when it issues a writ of certiorari and quashes an order to quash the order only to the extent that it affected the petitioner. Mr. Vimadalal says that the only person who has made a grievance of the award is the petitioner, the other workers have not come before the Court, and therefore, there is no reason why the award should not be quashed so far as the appellant alone is concerned. He has relied on certain observations of the Court of appeal in Abdul Majid v. P. R. Nayak, 53 Bom. L.R. 621 at p. 653. In that case we were considering the order of the Custodian and only one person affected by the order had come to this Court and therefore we set aside the order only to the extent that the petitioner was prejudiced. We pointed out that as others had been content with the order of the Custodian and had taken no steps to challenge the order, there was no reason why the order as a whole should be set aside. But in the very judgment we were at pains to point out that there may undoubtedly be cases where although a party affected by an order may come to Court, proper justice can only be done if the order is set aside as a whole and not only to the extent that it affects the interest of the petitioner, and, in delivering the judgment, I further added that I should not be understood to say that the Court has not the power and the jurisdiction in proper cases to set aside an order, which is in excess of jurisdiction or ultra vires, as a whole, although it is challenged by only one party affected by the order.

[6] Now, the question is whether in this particular case the order of the Appellate Tribunal should be set aside only to the extent that it affects the petitioner or it should be set aside as a whole. For this purpose we must look at the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 18 makes an award which has become enforceable binding not only on the parties to the industrial dispute but also on all workmen who are employed in an establishment to which the dispute relates, and not only on all workmen who are employed by the establishment at the date of the dispute but upon all persons who are subsequently employed in that establishment; and the award is defied as a fin