IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Chagla, C.J.
Appellants: Iron Hardware (India) Co.
Vs.
Respondent: Firm Shamlal Bros.
Civil Revn. Appln. Nos. 1261, 1384 and 1385 of 1953
Decided On: 14.01.1954
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: J.L. Nain, P.L. Nain and A. Gupta, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: R.R. Karnik and G.K. Kamat, Advs.
DISPLACED PERSONS (DEBTS ADJUSTMENT) ACT, 1951 - SECTION 2(6), 2(10), 25 - CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 - ORDER 30, RULE 1 - Whether a displaced person can maintain an application under the Act in the name of the firm in which they are carrying on business - Whether the Act covers cases of damages for breach of contract.
Fact of the Case:
The applicants, displaced persons, filed applications under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, in the name of their firm against three debtors for damages for breach of contract. The debtors challenged the maintainability of the applications on the grounds that (i) a firm cannot be a 'displaced person' within the meaning of the Act, and (ii) the Act does not cover cases of damages for breach of contract.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that (i) a firm can be a 'displaced person' within the meaning of the Act, as the definition of 'displaced person' in Section 2(10) of the Act includes individuals as well as persons, and (ii) the Act does not cover cases of damages for breach of contract, as 'debt' as defined in Section 2(6) of the Act requires an existing pecuniary liability, which does not arise in the case of a breach of contract until damages are assessed by a court.
Issues: 1. Whether a firm can be a 'displaced person' within the meaning of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951? 2. Whether the Act covers cases of damages for breach of contract?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The definition of 'displaced person' in Section 2(10) of the Act includes individuals as well as persons, and a firm is merely a compendious way of describing certain number of persons who carry on business as partners in a particular name. Therefore, if the individual partners of a firm satisfy the definition of 'displaced person', they can maintain an application under the Act in the name of the firm. 2. 'Debt' as defined in Section 2(6) of the Act requires an existing pecuniary liability, which does not arise in the case of a breach of contract until damages are assessed by a court. Therefore, the Act does not cover cases of damages for breach of contract.
Final Decision: The court set aside the order of the lower court and held that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications. The applications were dismissed with costs throughout.
1. These three revision applications raise a common question. Applications were made by creditors who allege that they are displaced persons within the meaning of Act 70 of 1951 for damages for breach of contract, and two principal questions arise for my determination. One is whether it is competent to displace persons to maintain an application under this Act in the name of the firm in which they are carrying on business, and the second is whether the Act covers cases of damages for breach of contract.
2. Turning to the first point, it is not disputed that the partners of the firm which has made applications against three debtors in these three applications are displaced persons. But what is urged is that the firm does not satisfy the definition of "displaced person" given in Section 2 (10). The definition is:
" displaced person means any person who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of West Pakistan, has, after the 1st day of March, 1947, left, or been displaced from, his place of residence in such area and who has been subsequently residing in India, and Includes any person who is resident in any place now forming part of India and who for that reason is unable or has been rendered unable to manage, supervise or control any immovable property belonging to him in West Pakistan, but does not include a banking company;"
Now, what is urged is that this definition by its very nature can only apply to an individual and the Legislature has emphasised the aspect of residence and no other aspect. It would be impossible, it is urged, to suggest that a firm can reside in the sense in which that word is used in this definition. The residence contemplated is a human residence and it cannot apply to an entity like a firm but it can only apply to individuals. In my opinion it is clear that there is no such legal entity as a firm. A firm is merely a compendious way of describing certain number of persons who carry on business as partners in a particular name, but in law and in the eye of the law the firm really I consists of the individual partners who go to constitute that firm. Therefore, the persons before the tribunal are the individual partners of the firm and not a legal entity consisting of the firm. Therefore, if the individual partners of the firm satisfy the definition of "displaced person given in the Act, I see no reason why such an application cannot be maintained, and as I said before it is not disputed that all the partners of this firm satisfied the definition of "displaced person".
3. Reliance was placed on a decision of Mr. Justice Pawcett in - Dharamsey v. BalKrishna pandurang, AIR 1929 Bom 378 (A). The learned judge there was dealing with the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act and a suit had been filed against a certain firm on the original Side of the High Court, and the firm contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit because the partners were agriculturists as defined in the Dekkhan Agriculturists Belief Act and all the partners resided outside jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Fawcett rejected that contention and he took the view that for the purpose of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Belief Act, although each partner might be an agriculturist, still it did not make the firm which was being sued an agriculturist, and this is what is being strongly relied upon by Mr. Nain.
It should be borne in mind that the principal question that the learned Judge had to decide was a question of jurisdiction and in his judgment he particularly relies on the fact that under Order 30, Rule 1, two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in British India can be sued as a firm, and what the learned Judge points out is that for the purpose of jurisdiction what was to be considered was whether the firm carried on business within jurisdiction and not
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