The Appellate Tribunal cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Industrial Tribunal unless it is shown that the discretion was exercised unjudicially, that well-settled principles of law were not applied, or that well-settled principles of law were wrongly applied.

Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 33 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION - SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW - JUDICIAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - INTERFERENCE BY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL.
Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a driver employed by the respondent company, was found smoking in a prohibited area at the Santa Cruz Aerodrome. The company applied for permission to dismiss the petitioner under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The Industrial Tribunal refused permission, but the Appellate Tribunal reversed the decision and granted permission. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal, arguing that no substantial question of law arose from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as no substantial question of law arose from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. The court observed that the Industrial Tribunal had exercised its discretion judicially in refusing permission to dismiss the petitioner, and that the Appellate Tribunal could not interfere with that decision merely because it disagreed with the Industrial Tribunal's assessment of the appropriate punishment.
Issues: 1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. 2. Whether the Industrial Tribunal had exercised its discretion judicially in refusing permission to dismiss the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is limited to appeals involving a substantial question of law. 2. The Industrial Tribunal has a wide discretion to grant or refuse permission to dismiss an employee under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 3. The Appellate Tribunal cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Industrial Tribunal unless it is shown that the discretion was exercised unjudicially, that well-settled principles of law were not applied, or that well-settled principles of law were wrongly applied.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. The court held that the Industrial Tribunal had exercised its discretion judicially in refusing permission to dismiss the petitioner, and that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with that decision.

JUDGMENT - Chagla, C.J.

1. This is an appeal from the judgment of Desai J. by which he dismissed the petition presented by the appellant under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

2. The petitioner was in the service of the second respondent company as a driver; and on 28th November 1952, he was on duty at the Santa Cruz Aerodrome in an area where smoking Is prohibited, and was found smoking in that area. Action was taken by the second respondent company against the petitioner for smoking in the prohibited area.

The petitioner admitted his guilt, and the second respondent company applied under Section 33, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for the permission of the Industrial Court for dismissing the petitioner. The Industrial Court refused the permission. On that the second respondent company preferred an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, and the Appellate Tribunal reversed the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and granted the permission sought for by the second respondent company.

3. It is urged by the petitioner that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the, appeal as the decision of the Industrial Tribunal did not involve any substantial question of law.

4. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal is to be found in Section 7 of the Act of 1950. That section provides that

"subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an industrial tribunal if (a) the appeal involves any substantial question of law; or (b) the award or decision is in respect of any of the matters" which are enumerated in that Sub-section. It is common ground that an appeal does not lie under Sub-section (b) of Section 7, and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal can only be justified provided the appeal involves a substantial question of law.

5. Now, in order to decide whether any substantial question of law arose from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal, we must consider Lhe nature of the application made by the second respondent company, the powers of the Industrial Court, and the decision that the Industrial Court gave. Section 33, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides that

"During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, no employer shall-

(a) alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or

(b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be."

Therefore, clearly the object of this section is to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Board or Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute.

6. Admittedly proceedings were pending before the Industrial Tribunal, and admittedly the petitioner was concerned in such dispute. The Legislature, therefore, provided that if the employer wanted to alter the status quo, he had to get the express permission either of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be. It is also clear that by Section 33 a wide discretion was conferred upon the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be, to grant the permission. Therefore, when the Industrial Tribunal refused to grant permission, it exercised a discretion conferred upon it by Section 33; and the very narrow question that arises for our determination is that, when a Court upon which discretion is conferred exercises that discretion, under what circumstances is an Appellate Tribunal entitled to interfere on the ground that a substantial question of law arises with regard to the exercise of that discretion.

We should have thought that the principles with regard

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