A surrender by a Hindu widow is not an alienation of her rights in favour of the reversioner. The reversioner does not occupy the position of a grantee or transferee, and does not derive his title from her. He derives his title from the last male holder as his successor-in-law and the rights of succession are opened out by the act of self-effacement on the part of the widow which operates in the same manner as her physical death.

JUDGMENT - Gajendragadkar, J.

1. This appeal raises the vexed question of Hindu law as to the character and effect of the act of surrender on the part of a Hindu widow. We have had occasion to refer this question to a Pull Bench in -- Pandu Lote v. Shrimati, AIR 1953 Bom 428 (A) along with another question. While dealing with the questions referred by us to the Full Bench, the Pull Bench considered and answered the first question, but they held that it was unnecessary to answer the second question, and it is the second question which arises for decision in the present appeal. It is perfectly true that, though in this judgment the learned Chief Justice has said that it is unnecessary to consider the point raised by the second question submitted to the Full Bench, he has indicated the view which the Pull Bench were likely to take if they had felt it necessary to decide this point. Perhaps if the matter had stood with the decision of the Full Bench alone, we might have proceeded to deal with this appeal in the light of the assistance available from the observations made by the learned Chief Justice as to the second question. But the position has been somewhat complicated by reason of the fact that Mr. Jahagirdar for the respondents contends that the validity even of these observations must be taken to be considerably impaired by the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in -- Natwarlal Punjabhai v. Dadu-bhai Manubhai, AIR 1954 SO 61 (B).

2. It would be convenient to mention a few material facts leading to the point which we are referring to the Full Bench. The property in suit consists of two houses and two pieces of land. This property originally belonged to one Balappa. Balappa died in 1908 leaving behind him surviving his widow Shrimati and his daughter Ratna. Srimati was defendant No. 1 to the present suit when it was filed. Pending the suit, Shrimati died on 10-9-1950. Prior to her death and long before the present suit had been filed, Shrimati had adopted a son on 15-9-1935, who was defendant No. 2 to the suit. Balappas daughter Ratna was married to Chintaman. Chiritaman died in 1908 and Ratna herself in 1911. Their son Vasant survived them. On 24-6-1920, Shrimati executed a deed of gift in favour of Vasant. On 1-7-1935, Vasant died leaving behind him his widow Rajubai. Rajubai adopted the plaintiff on 4-3-1936. Thereafter she died on 31-1-1942. It would appear that it was after Vasant died that Shrimati thought of adopting a son to herself and she did so on 15-9-1935. In the present suit filed by the adopted son of Vasant, he claims to recover possession of the properties on the ground that they have been validly surrendered in favour of Vasant by the limited owner Shrimati. Shrimatis adopted son resisted this claim on several grounds. He alleged that the deed of gift had not been executed, that it was obtained by undue influence, that it was not acted upon and that it did not cover all the properties of which Shrimati was possessed as a limited owner,

All these pleas have been rejected by the trial Court. But defendant No. 2 has succeeded on the ground that, as the adopted son of Shrimati, he is entitled to divest the estate which had vested in Vasant as a surrenderee from Shrimati and on Vasants death would have devolved on the present plaintiff. In upholding this plea, two decisions were cited before the learned Judge. The first decision is reported in -- Shantaram Abasaheb Powar v. Keru Krishna, AIR 1948 Bom 381 (C) and the second in -- Vishnu Pandu v. Mahadu Baburao, AIR 1951 Bom 170 (D). Since these two decisions took a contrary view on the point which the learned Judge had to decide, he preferred to follow the latter ruling of this Court and hold that the adopted son would divest the estate which may have vested before his adoption in the surrender by reason of the surrender on the part of his adoptive mother, it is this finding which is challenged before us by Mr. Datar.

3. In Pandu Lotes case (A), similar questions

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