1. This matter came before me on 13-12-1951. The learned District Judge had taken the view that the decision of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act directing the employer to pay certain wages to his employee was incompetent inasmuch as the Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether the suspension of the employee was rightful or wrongful. Having taken that view the learned District Judge did not decide the appeal on merits. I, therefore, Sent the matter back to him and directed him to decide the appeal on merits.

The learned District Judge decided in favour of the employee on merits, but he held that part of the claim of the employee was barred inasmuch as the Authority had wrongly condoned the delay in making the original application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, and therefore, he allowed the claim of the employee only in part. It is from that decision that this revision application is preferred, and the first contention urged by Mr. Latifi is that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to reverse in appeal a decision of the Authority condoning the delay on the part of the employee.

2. In order to decide this point it is necessary to look at the scheme of the Payment of Wages Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 provides that where contrary to the provisions of the Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person may apply to the Authority for a direction under Sub-section (3). The first proviso to this Sub-section lays down the period of limitation and that period is that the application must be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be. Then there is a second proviso to this Sub-section and that is that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause (or not making the application within such period.

Therefore, a statutory right is given to every employee to present an application within six months under Sub-section (2) of Section 15. If he presents an application beyond six months, he has no right to do so, and an order is necessary from the Authority under the second proviso before such an application can be admitted, and the Authority can only make such an order provided it is satisfied that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the statutory period. Then we come to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 and that provides that when any application under Sub-section (2) is entertained, the Authority shall hear the applicant and the-employer or other person responsible for the payment cf wages under Section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as may be necessary may, (and I am quoting the relevant part of the Sub-section) direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit.

Sub-section (4) of Section 15 gives the power to the Authority to impose a fine not exceeding. Rs. 50 upon the employee to be paid to the employer if it is satisfied that the application was either malicious or vexatious. Then comes Section 17 which is a section which deals with appeals, and that section provides that an appeal against a direction made under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) of Section 15 may be preferred to the tribunal mentioned in that Sub-section. Now an appeal is always the creature of statute and the right of appeal is limited by the law which gives that right, and an appellate Court can-not exercise wider powers of correcting the lower Court than are strictly conferred upon it by the law which creates the appellate Court. Therefore, it is clear that under Section 17 the powers of the appellate