Tukaram Piraji and Anr. vs Motilal Poona Mills Ltd.

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1953 Supreme(Bom) 13

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Chagla, C.J. and Dixit Y.V. , J.
Appellants: Tukaram Piraji and Anr.
Vs.
Respondent: Motilal Poona Mills Ltd.
Special Civil Appln. No. 159 of 1953
Decided On: 02.07.1953
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: N.V. Phadke and M.V. Paranjpe, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: N.K. Gamadia, Motichand and Devidas, Advs.
Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1955
Decided on: 31.10.1956

Headnote:A.Right of Appeal - Central Legislation - notice to workers to work on four looms instead of two - workers stopped work - Labour Court held it as an illegal change brought by the Mills - matter went to Labour Appellate Tribunal(central) - contention: no right of appeal - the scheme of Section 2(c) (ii) and (iii) is to give a right of appeal where no right of appeal existed under the State legislation. Under the State legislation the decision of the Labour Court, whether a strike was illegal or not, was final and no appeal lay from that decision. The Central Act dealt with this very contingency and provided a right of appeal to the appellate tribunal - held, the only test that clause (iii) lays down is that no appeal should lie from a particular decision, and it cannot be disputed that no appeal lies from the decision of the Labour Court holding that the strike was not illegal.(Para 3).
B.Illegal change - Appellate Tribunal - Section 7 of Article 48 of Act of 1950 - Writ under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution - notice of change - Section 42 of Bombay Industrial Relation Act - workers made to work on four looms instead of two - workers stopped work - Labour Court held it was not illegal strike or lockout but it was illegal change - Labour Appellate Tribunal held, it was illegal strike as notice of change not required under section 42 - section 97 not contravened - order of Tribunal set aside and Labour Court order upheld. (Para 5, 6 and 7)

Judgment - Chagla, C.J.

1. This is an application made by the employees of the Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills, Ltd., which is opponent No. 1, under Articles. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ against the Labour Appellate Tribunal. It appears that on 29-8-1951, notice was given by opponent No. 1 Mills that weavers will be required to work on four looms instead of two looms. Pursuant to this notice, there was a cessation of work by the weavers from September 6. Opponent No. 1 Mills made an application to the Labour Court that the cessation of work by the weavers constituted an illegal strike, and the weavers on their part made an application to the Labour Court that the cessation of work constituted an illegal lock-out, and they also contended that no notice had been given of the change by the Mills as required by Section 42, Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and therefore the change made was an illegal change.

Petitioner No. 1 is a weaver and petitioner No. 2 is the Poona Girni Kamgar Union. The Labour Court held that there was neither an illegal strike nor an illegal lock-out, but there was an illegal change brought about by the Mills. From this decision an appeal was preferred to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and the Labour Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the cessation of work constituted an illegal strike. It is in respect of this order that this petition is preferred.

2. The first contention urged by Mr. Phadke is that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is to be found in Section 7 of Acticle 48 of 1950. That section provides: Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an industrial tribunal if--..... and then various matters are set out which constitute the subject-matter of the appeal.

Therefore, under Section 7 two conditions have got to be satisfied in order to confer jurisdiction upon the Appellate Tribunal. The first condition must be that the appeal must bo from an award or decision of an industrial tribunal, and the second condition is that the subject-matter of the appeal must fall in one of the clauses set out in Section 7. In this particular case the Appellate Tribunal entertained the appeal because it involved a substantial question of law, and there is no dispute before us that as far as the subject-matter was concerned the provisions of Section 7 were satisfied.

But what is urged by Mr. Phadke before us is that the appeal was not from an industrial tribunal as defined in Section 2(c), Acticle 43 of 1950. That Sub-section defines an industrial tribunal as "(i) any industrial tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act."

It is not the contention of opponent No. 1 Mills that this is an industrial tribunal as defined by clause (i) of Section 2(c). Clause (ii) of Section 2 (c) constitutes all appellate tribunals, where appellate tribunals have been set up by State legislation and to which appeals can be preferred from tribunals of first instance, as industrial tribunals. Therefore, under this clause if a Labour Court in a State gave a decision and an appeal lay to an appellate authority within the State, then that appellate authority would be an industrial tribunal for the purpose of this Act.

Then comes clause (iii) which is the relevant clause which we have to consider:

"in relation to other cases, where no appeal lies under any law referred to in Sub-clause (ii), any court, board or other authority set up in any State under such law;....."

Therefore, clause (iii) deals with cases which do not fall in clause (ii), and clause (iii) specifically refers to cases where no appeal lies under a State law. In other words, the scheme of clauses. (ii) and (iii) of Section 2(c) is fairly clear. The object of the Central Act was to give a further right of appeal from final labour authorities in the State. If the final autho

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