IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Gajendragadkar P.B, J.
Appellants: U.D. Patel and Co.
Versus
Respondent: C.M. Milligam and Clarke Ltd.
Appeal From Order No. 162 of 1955 with Civil Appln. No. 2634 of 1955
Decided On: 13.12.1955
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: B.J. Kapadia, Adv., i/b., Hasan Baxi and Co., Attorneys
For Respondents/Defendant: J.S. Lam, Adv., i/b., Eastly Lam and Co., Attorneys
INJUNCTION - ARBITRATION (PROTOCOL AND CONVENTION) ACT, 1937 - SECTION 7 - SUIT FOR INJUNCTION RESTRAINING RESPONDENTS FROM OBTAINING DECREE IN TERMS OF FOREIGN AWARD - WHETHER MAINTAINABLE - ORDER 39, RULE 2, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - WHETHER APPLICABLE - INHERENT JURISDICTION OF COURT UNDER SECTION 151, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - WHETHER CAN BE INVOKED - COMPANION PROCEEDINGS - WHETHER CAN BE ORDERED.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obtaining a decree in terms of a foreign award. The defendants filed a petition under Section 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, seeking enforcement of the foreign award. The plaintiffs took out a notice of motion for an interim injunction pending the final decision of the suit. The trial court dismissed the notice of motion.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the appeal from the order dismissing the notice of motion was incompetent as it was not an order passed under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but under the inherent jurisdiction of the court under Section 151. The court further held that the suit for injunction was maintainable as some of the contentions raised by the plaintiffs did not fall under Section 7(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, which provides for the enforcement of foreign awards. The court directed the trial court to try the petition and the suit as companion proceedings.
Issues: 1. Whether the appeal from the order dismissing the notice of motion was competent. 2. Whether the suit for injunction was maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. An appeal from an order passed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not competent. 2. A suit for injunction is maintainable if the contentions raised by the plaintiff do not fall under Section 7(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937.
Final Decision: The court directed the trial court to try the petition and the suit as companion proceedings.
1. This is an appeal by the plain-tiffs against the order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court refusing to grant an injunction as prayed by them. It appears that between the plaintiffs and the defendants two proceedings are at present pending. The respondents have filed a petition in the City Civil Court on 23-6-1955.
This petition has been filed under Section 5, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 6 of 1937. The respondents case is that a foreign award has been validly made between them and the appellants and they want the City Civil Court to pass a decree In terms of this award. While the petition was pending in the trial Court, the appellants filed their suit No. 2554 of 1955.
In this suit fine appellants in substance contend that a decree in terms of the foreign award should not be passed and they have made several allegations in support of this prayer. It is a suit filed to obtain a permanent injunction restraining the respondents Irani taking any further steps in the matter of obtaining a decree in terms of the foreign award.
Alter this suit was filed by the appellants, they took out a notice of motion and they urged that pending the final decision of this suit the respondents should be restrained making any further progress with their petition. This notice of motion was dismissed by the learned trial Judge and the appellants have come to this court in the present appeal against the said dismissal of the notice of motion.
2. Mr. Lam for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection. He contends that the appeal from order preferred by the plaintiffs against the dismissal of their notice of motion is incompetent. It is clear that, if an order is passed under Order 39 granting or refusing to grant an injunction, the said order is appealable under Order 43 of the Code.
On the other hand, if a prayer for injunction is made, riot under the relevant provisions of Order 39, but under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 and an order is passed either granting an injunction or refusing to grant it, the said order would not be appealable, and according to Mr. Lam, considering the material averments made in the plaint and in the affidavits in support of the notice of motion it would be clear that the notice of motion was taken out under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court and not under Order 39, Rule 2.
On the other hand, Mr. Kapadia for the appellants has relied upon the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2, and he argues that the words in Rule 2 of Order 39 are wide enough to include a claim for injunction such as has been made in the plaint and the claim for temporary injunction which has been made in the notice of motion. Rule 2 of Order 39 deals with suits for restraining the defendants from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, and it provides that in such suits an order of interim injunction may be passed in an appropriate case.
The words "other injury of any kind", says Mr. Kapadia, must be very liberally construed and the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief by way of interim injunction, where a party asking for such injunction is able to show other injury of any kind should not be denied. In support of this argument. Mr. Kapadia has invited my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court/ in Umapati Choudhari v. Subodh Chandra Choudhari, 1953 Cal. 377 (AIR V 40) (A).
In this case, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court were dealing with a claim for injunction made by persons who were not present at the time when a decree for partition was passed and the question which arose for decision was whether a claim for injunction in such circumstances could be maintained under Order 39, Rule 2.
It is true, as Mr. Kapadia points out, that Das Gupta, J. in dealing with the scope and effect of the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2, has observed that the word "injury" should be given its widest denotation. But it is clear from the judgment that the learned
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