1. This is an appeal against a judgment of Coyajee J.," and preliminary objections are taken by Mr. Purshottam on behalf of respondent 1 that the appeal is barred by limitation. The judgment of Coyajee J., was delivered in an Originating summons and the learned Judge answered most of the questions on 11-8-1954.

Some questions were not answered and certain directions remained to be given, and therefore the Originating summons came on again before the learned Judge on 15-9-1954 on which day he delivered his final judgment. Therefore the period of limitation for an appeal on the Original Side is 20 days. The appeal was filed on 8-12-1954. Primp, facie, therefore, the appeal is barred by limitation.

2. Now, what is contended by Mr. Desai is that he is entitled to exclusion of time under Section 12 (2). Limitation Act. His contention is that time was requisite for getting a copy of the order made by Coyajee J., and that time can be excluded under the provisions of Section 12 (2). As a matter of fact, a certified copy of the order was issued to the appellant on 23-2-1955. .

Therefore, if the time taken between 15-9-1954 and 23-2-1955 was requisite time, then undoubtedly the appeal is in time because as a matter of fact the appeal was filed some time before the certified copy of the order was issued to the appellant, viz., on 8-12-1954. On 13-8-1954 the appellant applied for a copy of the order and on 10-9-1954 he applied for a copy of the judgment and a certified copy of the judgment was furnished to the appellant on 4-10-1954.

Therefore the appellant is entitled to exclude the time between 15-9-1954 and 4-10-1S54. As the appeal was filed on 8-12-1954 he would have to satisfy us that apart from 20 days which is the period of limitation, the rest of the time taken up was the time properly taken up for obtaining a certified copy of the order passed by Coyajee J.

3. Now, the question of a proper interpretation of Section 12 (2) was considered by a Pull Bench of this Court and the judgment is reported in -- Jayashankar Mulshankar v. Mayabhai, AIR 1952 Bom 122 (FB) (A). We have pointed out in that judgment that only that time can be excluded which is properly required for the purpose of obtaining a copy of the order and in that case we considered the matter from two aspects, the aspect from the point of view of the Appellate Side and the aspect from the point of view of the Original Side, we drew attention there to the distinction in the practice prevailing in the districts and on the Original Side.

In the districts ordinarily it is for the Court to draw an order or a decree and the time taken up by the Court would ordinarily be exempted. On the Original Side the practice is entirety different. The order is to be drawn up by attorneys and therefore on the Original Side the Attorneys have to satisfy us that the time they took in drawing up the order was the time properly required for doing so.

4. Now, under Rule 273 it is incumbent upon an attorney to draw up an order if he wants a certified copy of that order. After drawing up the order he must submit a draft of the order to all the other parties concerned and if they do not return the order approved then again it is made incumbent upon the attorney to apply to the Prothonotary for an appointment to settle the draft before him.

Then the rules provide for a meeting to be held by the Prothonotary where all parties and their attorneys are present and the draft order is finally settled at the meeting and after the draft order is settled the order has got to be engrossed and ultimately sealed by the Prothonotarys office. In this case the most significant feature is that although the appellants attorneys obtained a copy of the judgment on 4-10-1954 they did nothing at all with regard to the drawing up of the order.

Mr. Desai has suggested a rather curious practice as prevailing in this Court. We do not think such a practice prevails and if it does the sooner it is put an end to the better. Wh