The word "premises" in Clause (m) of Section 2, Factories Act, 1948, means not only buildings, but includes lands as well.

Headnote:
FACTORIES ACT - PREMISES - MANUFACTURING PROCESS - CONSTRUCTION - SALT WORKS - WHETHER PREMISES - WHETHER MANUFACTURING PROCESS CARRIED ON - FACTORIES ACT, 1948, SECS. 2(K) (1), 2(M), 6, 92.
Fact of the Case:

The respondent was charged with an offence under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948, for breach of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, read with Rule 4 of the Bombay Factories Rules, 1950. The respondent was the occupier of the Wadia Mahal Salt Works at Wadala where salt was made. The question arose whether the site where the salt works were situated was "premises" within the meaning of Clause (m) of Section 2 and whether the salt was made as a result of any manufacturing process within the meaning of Clause (k) (1) of Section 2.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the word "premises" in Clause (m) of Section 2, Factories Act, 1948, means not only buildings, but includes lands as well. The Court also held that a manufacturing process is being carried on upon the salt works.
Issues: 1. Whether the site where the salt works were situated was "premises" within the meaning of Clause (m) of Section 2? 2. Whether the salt was made as a result of any manufacturing process within the meaning of Clause (k) (1) of Section 2?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the word "premises" in Clause (m) of Section 2, Factories Act, 1948, means not only buildings, but includes lands as well. The Court relied on the following factors: a. The definition of premises in Section 5, Sub-section (8), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Bombay Act, 57 of 1947, which includes any land not being used for agricultural purposes and any building or part of a building let separately. b. The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Factories Act, 1948, was to regulate labour and the provisions of the Act clearly show that the said regulation was intended for the benefit and welfare of the workers. c. The interpretation of the word premises occurring in Clause (m) of Section 2 is thrown by a comparison of the definition of factory in Sub-section (3) of Section 2, Factories Act, 1911, with the definition as contained in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the present Act (the Factories Act, 1948). d. The meaning assigned to the term premises by eminent authorities such as Wharton, Stroud and Burrows. 2. The Court held that a manufacturing process is being carried on upon the salt works. The Court relied on the following factors: a. The workmen employed on the salt works are dealing with the sea-water in a particular manner and but for the dealing with it in that manner, salt as made on these works would not be made. b. The separation of the sea-water from the sea is the first step in making the product of the said water an article of use, sale etc.; and this very first step is dependent upon human agency. c. The making and preparation of the reservoir, the tapavanis and crystallisation pans, without which salt as made on these works cannot be made even with the best and kindest of natures intentions, is the work of human agency.
Final Decision: The Court reversed the judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, held that the Wadia Mahal Salt Works of which the respondent is the occupier are a Factory and that the respondent committed an offence under Section 92, Factories Act, 1948, in that he failed to obtain a licence for working the salt works under Section 6 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Act. The Court convicted the respondent of this offence and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 25/-.

JUDGMENT - 1. This is an appeal by the State of Bombay from a judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, acquitting the respondent who was charged with having committed an offence under Section 92, Factories Act 1948, for breach of the provisions of Section 6, Factories Act, 1948, read with Rule 4 of the Bombay Factories Rules, 1950.

The appeal raises an important question-of construction of Clause (k) (1) and Clause (m) of Section 2, Factories Act 1948. The respondent is the occupier of the Wadia Mahal Salt Works at Wadala where the salt is made, and the questions which have arisen before us are whether the site where the salt works are situated is "premises" within the meaning of Clause (m) of Section 2 and whether the sale is made as a result of any manufacturing process within the meaning of Clause (k) (1) of Section 2.

2. The respondent, Ardeshir Hormusji Bhiwandiwala is a partner in the firm of Messrs. H. M. O. H. Bhiwandiwala and Co. who are occupiers of the Wadia Mahal Salt Works situated at Wadala, Bombay. The complainant in this case is one Mr. Bapat, an Inspector of Factories, and on 18-7-1953 he filed a complaint against the respondent.

The gist of the complaint was that the respondent, who was the occupier of the Wadia Mahal Salt Works, which were a factory under Section 2(m), Factories Act, had failed to submit to the Chief Inspector of Factories, Bombay State, an application in Form No. 2 for the registration of the factory and for the grant of a licence as required under Section 6, Factories Act, read with Rule 4 of the Bombay Factories Rules, 1950.

The complaint stated that by reason of the abovementioned contravention of the provisions of Section 6, Factories Act read with Rule 4 of the Bombay Factories Rules, the respondent had committed an offence under Section 92, Factories Act.

3. When the case went up first before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate for trial, he held that as the complaint against the respondent was made beyond the period of three months from the date on which the commission of the offence had come to the knowledge of the complainant, it was barred by limitation under Section 106 of the Act.

Accordingly, he ordered the complaint to be dismissed. There was an appeal to the High Court by the State of Bombay against that order of dismissal and the High Court held that, so far as the failure to have the factory registered under the provisions of the Act was concerned, it was not a continuing offence and that, therefore, the complaint in so far as that part of the charge was concerned was barred by limitation at the date upon which it was filed.

But, in respect of the charge that the respondent had failed to make an application for the grant of a licence to him for the working of this factory, the High Court held that the failure to apply for a licence was a continuing offence, and that a fresh offence was committed on each.

day upon which the factory was worked without a licence.

The pertinent observations which the High Court made in that appeal, which was Cri. Appeal No. 762 of 1954 (Bom) (A), were these:

"Every day that the respondent used the premises as a factory without obtaining a licence, he has committed a fresh offence, and in respect of each fresh offence, a separate prosecution is competent. The failure of the complainant to prosecute the respondent for the earlier offences committed by him cannot, in our opinion, justify the application of the provisions of Section 108 in support of his plea of limitation."

Consistently with this view which the High Court took, the Court sent back the case to the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate with a direction that the learned Magistrate should deal with second charge, viz. the charge regarding the respondent running his factory without obtaining a licence, in accordance with law.

4. On the case going back to the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate for disposal according to law in respect of the second charge against t

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