To constitute obstruction under Section 186 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary for the accused to use actual criminal force. A show of force or any act preventing the execution of the process of the civil court is sufficient.

1. This is an appeal by the State against the acquittal of the accused upon a complaint filed against them for an offeuce punishable under Section 186, Penal Code. The facts leading upto the prosecution of the accused may he shortly stated.

2. There is, in the village Chandor of the Chandor Taluka of the Nasik District, a field bearing survey No. 131 pot Ilissa No. 1 admeasuring 40 acres and 19 gunthas (pot kharab 34 gunthas) and assessed at Rs. 31-1-0. According to the present record, the land is survey No. 131 pot hissa No. 1A admeasuring 27 acres and 26 gunthas (pot kharab 28 gunthas) and assessed at Rs. 21-4-0. This land originally belonged to accused 1 to 3 who sold it on 12-12-1936 to one Dhanji Damodar Sonje of Chandor for Rs. 2500.

The property was subsequently given by Dhanji to accused 1 who passed a writing by way of a lease on 14-6-1939. As agreed to in the rent note, accused 1 did not give possession to Dhanji who filed a Civil Suit (No. 377 of 1943) against accused 1 for possession and on 3-3-1944 obtained a decree in his favour.

3. On 4-10-1949 Dhanji filed a Darkhast (No. 1 of 1949) to execute the decree and in that darkhast a notice was issued to accused 1. In obedience to the notice accused 1 appeared before the Court and filed an application to the Court that there was litigation between him and the decree-holder and that the darkhast might be kept pending till the decision of that litigation. The litigation ended in favour of the decree-holder and in appeal the decision was confirmed on 17-12-1952,

On 24-7-1953 Dhanji applied to the Court, requesting that the darkhast be proceeded with and on 10-8-1953 the Court ordered to issue a warrant for possession. A warrant was issued and sent for execution, and at this time accused 2 and 3 obstructed the plough by standing before the plough and by taking out the yoke pins and driving the bullocks out of the field. They gave in writing their obstruction on 25-8-1953. Tins was the first obstruction.

There was also a second obstruction and then on 10-2-1954 upon a warrant being issued for possession against accused 1 to 3, they again obstructed execution by standing before the plough and taking out the yoke pins and driving away the bullocks out of the field by beating them. This last obstruction is the subject-matter of the present complaint which was filed against the respondents for an offence under Section 186, Penal Code.

At the trial, the decree-holder examined Bailiff Rama, a panch witness by name Shankar and himself. He also relied upon a writing which was an endorsement upon the warrant for possession, signed by accused 1, 2, and 3, The defence cited three witnesses including" a police patil.

4. Accused 2 filed a written statement in which he denied that they offered any obstruction. In para 10 of the written statement it was stated that he told the party, from the Bandh that possession should not be taken of the field since the field was in their possession for it long time. The statement of accused 1 and 3 was in a similar sense.

5. The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents of the offence, holding that the evidence proved that the bailiff voluntarily desisted from giving possession after the accused gave in writing their resolve not to part with their land, and that accordingly no offence under Section 186, Penal Code was committed. He concluded the judgment by observing that the respondents would, at the most, be liable for contempt of Court and no more. Feeling aggrieved by this order of acquittal, the State has come up in appeal.

6. Upon this appeal, the learned Government Pleader has argued that the learned Magistrate was wrong in taking the view that the present case was not covered by Section 186, Penal Code. Since this is an appeal from an acquittal, we would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless there were compelling reasons for us to do so. If upon the evidence the learned Magistrate has come to a conclusion whic