A decree passed by a Court without inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be executed.

1. This Second Appeal raises some interesting questions of law and one of them is whether a decree passed in a suit against a Ruling Chief without obtaining the previous consent of the Central Government under Section 36 of the Civil Procedure Code can operate as res judicata in the subsequent execution proceedings. The other question, really another facet of the same contention, is whether the Court to which a decree is transferred for execution has, under Order 21, Rule 7 of the Code, the power to question the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. The matter has been ably argued before me by Mr. Patwa, who appears for the appellant.

2. The appellant obtained a decree on a promissory note in a suit filed by him against the respondent in the Court of the Civil Judge at Himatnagar. A written statement was filed by the respondent, the Chief of Vasna State, and in substance one of the contentions raised by him was that he was a Ruling Chief when the decree was passed and was, in the absence of a certificate under Section 86 of the Code, not liable to be sued in the Municipal Courts of this country. He did not, however, appear at the hearing of the suit and the decree was passed ex parte. A darkhast filed by the decree-holder on 29th July 1953 was dismissed because one of the contentions raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor was that in any case the decree could not be executed against him in the absence of such certificate On 21st April 1954 the decree-holder, alter obtaining a certificate to execute the decree, filed the darkhast out of which arises this second appeal.

3. Before the executing Court to which the decree had been transferred, a contention was raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor that the decree against him was a nullity because before filing the suit no certificate as required by Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code had been obtained by the plaintiff. That contention prevailed and the darkhast was dismissed. An appeal preferred against that order was also dismissed by the lower appellate Court and 1he decree-holder has now come to this Court in second appeal.

4. Three contentions are pressed before me by learned counsel for the appellant. The first contention is that the decision of the Court at Himatnagar to the effect that it had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit operated as res judicata in these execution proceedings. The Court at Himatnagar had taken the view that the defendant was not a ruler. It is urged that the Court at Himatnagar having decided the question of jurisdiction that decision-of the Court operates as res judicata and therefore bars the contention now raised by the judgment-debtor. It is also urged that every Court is competent to decide whether it has jurisdiction or not to entertain and try any cause or matter coming before it. But these considerations cannot, in my opinion, override the primary consideration relating to the basic competence of that Court when the question is subsequently raised in another matter or before the Court which is called upon to execute that decree and the plea of res judicata is raised.

5. A judgment delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, because there is no inherence of jurisdiction in it, cannot operate as res judicata and if the Court which passed the decree was not competent at all to do so, there can be little scope for the doctrine of res judicata to operate. Where there is inherent want of jurisdiction in a Court, a decree passed by it is a nullity and if the decree is a nullity, no issue decided by the Court which passed the decree can operate as res judicata in any subsequent suit or proceedings; and a decree which is a nullity is incapable of execution. Now the defendant judgment-debtor was a person whose name was mentioned in the list of Ruling Chiefs in the White Paper published by the Central Government and the arguments before me had to proceed on the footing that a certificate was necessary before he could