The limitation period for filing a reference application to the High Court under the Bombay Sales Tax Act is governed by the law in force at the time the assessment proceedings were initiated, and not by the law in force at the time the reference application is made.

Headnote:
SALES TAX - Limitation for filing reference application to High Court - Whether governed by Section 34 of Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 or Section 23 of repealed Act of 1946 - Interpretation of Section 48(2) of Act of 1953 - Meaning of 'legal proceeding' - Whether assessment proceedings included - Continuation of proceedings on reference application to High Court.
Fact of the Case:

Petitioner challenged the order of the Tribunal refusing to refer a question of law to the High Court. The issue was whether the limitation period for filing the reference application was governed by Section 34 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (90 days) or Section 23 of the repealed Act of 1946 (60 days).
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the limitation period was governed by Section 23 of the Act of 1946, as the assessment proceedings were pending on November 1, 1952, when the Act of 1953 came into force. The Court interpreted Section 48(2) of the Act of 1953, which provided for the continuation of pending legal proceedings, to include assessment proceedings. The Court also held that the proceedings continued even when a reference application was made to the High Court.
Issues: 1. Whether the limitation period for filing the reference application was governed by Section 34 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 or Section 23 of the repealed Act of 1946? 2. Whether assessment proceedings were included in the term 'legal proceeding' under Section 48(2) of the Act of 1953? 3. Whether the proceedings continued even when a reference application was made to the High Court?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted Section 48(2) of the Act of 1953, which provided for the continuation of pending legal proceedings, to include assessment proceedings. The Court held that the expression 'legal proceeding' in Section 48(2)(ii) included assessment proceedings, and that in the case before it such proceedings were pending on November 1, 1952, because notice initiating the proceedings had been served on the applicants on October 28, 1952. 2. The Court held that the proceedings continued even when a reference application was made to the High Court. The Court reasoned that the assessment proceedings could only terminate when the rights of the assessee as well as the taxing authorities had been finally and irrevocably determined. Until then, whatever steps were taken to bring about the final and irrevocable determination were all steps in the legal proceedings and intended for the continuance and disposal of the legal proceedings.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the reference application was barred by limitation and that the Tribunal was correct in refusing to refer the question of law to the High Court.

Judgment -

TENDOLKAR, J:

1. This is a petition under Section 34 of the Bombay Bales Tax Act, 1953. A few relevant dates must be given at the outset. On the 28th of October 1952, proceedings under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, were initiated against the assessee by two notices and there was subsequently an ex parte assessment. On the 17th April 1956, revision application presented by the assessee to the Sales Tax Tribunal was dismissed by the Tribunal; but it is the assessees case that this order of dismissal was received by them only on the 15th of May 1956. On the 11th of August 1956. there was an application to the Tribunal to make a reference to the High Court. This application was dismissed by the Tribunal on the 6th of November 1956. The order of dismissal was received by the assesses on the 3rd to December 1956 and the present application was filed on the 7th of January 1957.

2. In answer to this application, a preliminary point has been raised on behalf of the State of Bombay that the application for reference made to the Tribunal on the 11th of August 1956 was barred by limitation and, therefore, there can be no question of entertaining the present application. It is also urged by way of a preliminary objection that, even assuming that the application for reference made to the Tribunal was within time, the present application to this Court is also barred by limitation. But since if the first objection is valid, viz., that the application for reference to the Tribunal was itself barred by limitation, obviously the second preliminary objection does not survive, we will proceed to consider the first objection.

3. On this objection, the first question that we are called upon to determine is: From what date does the period of limitation prescribed for making an application for statement of a case to the High Court begin to run - whether it is from the date when the revision application is dismissed by the Tribunal or whether it is from the date when the party aggrieved by the order has knowledge of the said order or the order is communicated to it? Now, the language used in Section 34 of the Act Of 1953, which corresponds to Section 23 of the Act of 1949, is that the starting point for the period of limitation will be " from the passing by the Tribunal of any order under subsection (2) of Section 30 or sub-section (1) of Section 31." Therefore, prima facie the period begins to run from the date of the order; but Mr. Palkhiwala for the assessee contends that there was an obligation on the Tribunal to communicate the order passed, and where such an obligation arises in law, although the terms of the statute may provide that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the order, the starting point will be the date when the order is communicated1 to the party aggrieved. A similar question came up for decision before a Division Bench, of which, I was a member, in Spl. Civil Appln. No. 2988 of 1959, DA3-7-1957 (Bom) (A). We were there concerned with Rule 8 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. The proviso to Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 was :

"Provided that an order passed under Sub-rule (2) or Sub-rule (3) may be set aside and the application re-heard on good cause being shown, within one month of the date of the said order ......"

It was urged in that case before us that notwithstanding the provision that the period of limitation was to begin to run from the date of the said order, it should in fact begin to run from the date when the party aggrieved had knowledge of the order. Reliance was placed on a decision, of the Allahabad High Court in Kharak Singh v. Laccham Singh, ILR 47 All. 332; (AIR 1925 All 293 (2) KB), where their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court had held that where a Judgment was signed, dated and delivered in the absence of the parties or their pleaders and without previous notice to them, the judgment was not validly pronounced; and we pointed out that this case turned on the specific prov

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