JUDGMENT - CHAGLA C. J. :

This appeal raises some important questions as to the interpretation of S. 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and we have listened to a very able argument from Mr. Phadke about the manner in which that section should be construed. It appears that the first appellant which is a union of workers who were employed in the second respondent company made certain demands on 27-3-1956 and as these demands were not accepted by the second respondent company, an application was made to the Conciliation Officer on 6-4-1956. After some preliminary discussions between May and September 1956 conciliation proceedings commenced and ultimately, as unfortunately so often happens in labour disputes, they failed. The Conciliation Officer made a report under S. 12 on 2-4-1957. On the 30th of July 1957 Government referred to adjudication certain items in the disputes. But they refused to refer certain other items and on 14-8-1957 the Government communicated to the parties the reasons for their refusal. Now, the items which the Government refused to refer were ten. They dealt with pay scales, confirmation, provident fund, additional gratuity, leave, overtime payment, uniforms, allowance, standing orders and the case of one Mr. Ferns. On receiving this intimation, the first appellant and the second appellant, who is an employee of the second respondent company, presented this petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Government to refer these matters for adjudication. Mr. Justice K. T. Desai issued a limited Writ of Mandamus calling upon the Government to reconsider their decision with regard to the question of provident fund and sick leave. With regard to the rest of the matters, he held that it was not open to the court to interfere with the decision arrived at by the Government. It is against this decision that this appeal is preferred.

(2) Now, before we go to the merits of the matter, it is necessary to look at the section and to consider what is the obligation of Government under that section. The section came up for consideration in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India Ltd. v. K. P. Krishnan, 57 Bom LR 1138 and in that judgment we pointed out that the expression may referred to in S. 12 refers to a duty imposed upon Government and that, although the Government undoubtedly had been given the power to make a reference, that power had been coupled with a duty and the duty was that if on a perusal of the report Government was satisfied that there was a case for reference, the duty imposed upon it clearly arose and the Government could not refuse to discharge that duty. We also pointed out that the next part of sub-s. (5) made it obligatory upon Government, when it did not make a reference, to record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. We were at pains to observe that it was perfectly true that the reasons given by the Government were not justiciable in the sense that the Court would not consider the weight or value or the quality or even the adequacy of the reasons given by the Government; but we pointed out that it was equally clear that the reasons which the Government had to give under this sub-section were reasons connected with the perusal of the report and with Government not being satisfied that there1 was a case for reference. It was observed that it was because Government was not satisfied that there was a case for reference that the duty to refer did not arise and what the Legislature required was that Government must give reasons why it was not satisfied that there was a case for reference. It was under these circumstances that we came to the conclusion that the reasons must be connected with the failure on the part of the Government to be satisfied that there was no case for reference. We, therefore, decided what our power in this case was by observing that it was equally clear that if the reasons had no connection, no bearing and no relevance to this question, then they were

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