a[ * * * * * *]

Assuming, however, that it is such an applica­tion, Mr Bobdes further contention is that the lower Court ought to have granted the necessary leave under Order 32, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs nos. 3, 4 and 5 and defen-

a. Portion of the judgment omitted is not ma­terial to this report - Ed.dants nos. 6 and 7 are still minors. No evidence whatsoever was led in the lower Court to show how the arrangement mentioned in the application no. 20 was in the interest and for the benefit of the minor parties. The learned trial Judge relied upon one circumstance, namely, plaintiffs offer to exchange their share for that of defendants nos. 4 to 7 and to pay the latter an additional sum of Rs. 25,000/-, and concluded that the plaintiffs share including those of the minor plaintiffs was prima facie inferior and that there appeared no special benefit to the minor plaintiffs by the pro­posed compromise. In the absence of any other evidence, I cannot say that the conclusion thus reached by the trial Judge is unjustified. It is significant to note that defendants Nos. I, and 8 to 10 in their application no. 30 describe the share allotted to defendants nos. 4 to 7 as the best list according to them and that it is in the interest of the minor defendants nos. 5 to 7 and defendant no. 4 to accept that allotment. Further the learned trial Judge did not record any finding as to whe­ther the arrangement was in any way beneficial to the minor defendants. Mr. Bobde also could not point to any evidence for showing how the arrange­ment was in the interest of the minor parties. I must, however, also state that Mr. Bobde submitted that I should call for a finding from the lower Court in this behalf after giving liberty to both parties to lead evidence. I have thought it unneces­sary to do so as in my view the appeal can be dis­posed of without calling for any further finding.

(2) In Muhammad Maracayar v. Muhammad Ammal, 91 Ind Cas 521 (Mad) it was held that one of the defendants having withheld his consent to the compromise it would be open to that defendant to agitate the matter and claim a partition of the properties in dispute afresh and on a different basis and as this obviously would not be in the interests of the minor the compromise was not for the benefit of the minor and should not be sanc­tioned.

(3) In the present case no application under Order 32, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, was made at all by the next friend of the minor plaintiffs. On the other hand, plaintiff No. 2 in his applica­tion dated 6-2-1956 clearly stated that no applica­tion for sanctioning the compromise had been made so far and that he did not also thereafter pro­pose to apply for any such sanction. Assuming that application No. 20 was itself also an application for leave under Order 32, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, as contended by Mr. Bobde, it may be not­ed that application was withdrawn when the de­fendants nos. 4 to 7 intimated that they were not in a position to accept it. Mr Bobde says that plaintiff no. 2 as the next friend of minor plaintiffs had no right to withdraw the application when once it had been solemnly filed in the Court. Ac­cording to Mr. Bobde, the withdrawal of the appli­cation under the circumstances was a capricious withdrawal without regard to the minors interests and it only entailed the removal of plaintiff no. 2 as minors next friend from the suit. I do not think the conduct of the next friend has any rele­vancy on the question whether he can withdraw an application under Order 32, rule 7, and whether the Court has any power to prevent such withdra­wal. If the conduct of the next friend or a guardian-ad-litem is found to be adverse to the interests of the minor, the Court may in an appropriate pro­ceeding taken in that behalf remove such next friend or guardian-ad-item, and may appoint a new next friend or guardian-ad-litem. But can the Court thereafter compel the new next friend or the guar-dian-ad-Mtem