SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1958 Supreme(Bom) 167

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
MUDHOLKAR, J.
M. F. De Souza, Defendant, Applicant,
Versus.
Childrens Education Uplift Society, Plaintiff, Opponent.
Civil Revn. Appln. No. 886 of 1958, D/-17-11-1958

JUDGMENT: This is a defendants application for revision of a judgment of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Bombay, decreeing the plaintiffs suit for possession of a portion of a room which is in the occupation of the defendant as a licensee by virtue of a compromise decree passed in the previous litigation between the parties by this Court. Now, one of she terms of the consent decree is that the defendant will be entitled to occupy the aforesaid portion of the room as a licensee and that the licence in her favour would be irrevocable. The plaintiff, which is an educational society, contends that it is entitled to revoke the licence because the defendant has not been paying any compensation to the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the portion of the room in her possession as a licensee. The defendant contended that the consent decree made no reference whatsoever to the payment of rent or compensation to the plaintiff, and that, therefore, she was not liable. She further stated that while she was a licensee in respect of the entire room, she used to pay Rs. 15/- per month as rent to the plaintiff, and now that she is in possession of only one-third the portion, she is liable to pay only Rs. 5/- per month. She has further stated that she has tendered rent or compensation to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month, but that the plaintiff has refused to accept it and therefore, according to her, she has committed no breach whatsoever of he terms of the licence.

(2) On behalf of the plaintiff it is contended before me that a licence must always be regarded as revocable at the will of the licensor except in the two cases set out in S. 60 of the Easements Act. Section 60 reads thus:

"License may be revoked by the grantor, unless —

(a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such -transfer is in force;

(b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution."

The learned Counsel for the plaintiff points out that there is no mention here of a third class of cases wherein a licence would be irrevocable, that is, cases where parties have agreed that it shall be irrevocable. In my opinion, the argument advanced by the learned Counsel is not sound. It is no doubt true that S. 60 mentions only two classes of cases in which, the licence could be regarded as irrevocable. This means that where a case falls in either of these categories the licence is made irrevocable by operation of law, that is the Easements Act. But apart from the Easements Act, there is the law of contract, and if parties enter into a contract and arrive at a solemn agreement to the effect that the licence shall be irrevocable or shall be limited for a particular duration, it follows that the licensor will be bound by his engagement and will not be entitled to terminate the licence or revoke the licence at his sweet will and pleasure. If authority were necessary for this proposition, I may refer to the following passage in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LIII, pp. 815-16 :

"As a general rule a mere license, that is, one which is merely a personal privilege not coupled with an interest in the land, may be revoked by the licensor at any time, at his pleasure. This rule generally applies regardless of how long the use has been permitted, and although the intention was to confer a continuing right, and even though the license was created by a deed or other written instrument The general rule, however, is not without its modifications and exceptions, and does not apply where the license is coupled with or partakes of the character of an easement and the rights under it are affirmatively and definitely fixed and settled, Or where it constitutes part of a contract between the parties.........."

Now, here the consent decree to which I have referred earlier was passed in an appeal which the plaintiff had brought to this Court from the dismissal of its suit for possession of the very room a portion of wh



Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top