JUDGMENT - (1) After narrating the facts and examining certain contentions of the counsel for the appellant, his Lordship proceeded). Then, it was urged by Mr. Chari that the learned Judge allowed inadmissible evidence to be admitted on the record and that evidence must have seriously prejudiced the mind of the jury against the appellant. Reliance was sought to be placed upon the complaint, Exhibit C, which was submitted by Rashida on 15th August 1958 to the Commissioner of Police. By that complaint the appellant was charged with being a drunkard a gambler, a man of notoriously bad character and a "white slaver" who desired to dispose of his own wife (Rashida) for the purpose of prostitution and that e had committed rape upon his sister-in-law. The question of the admissibility of this complaint was, it appears, not raised before the trial Court and the complaint was admitted in evidence. Mr. Chari contends that a statement made by the victim of an offence which is not proximate in time to the death and directly related to its cause is inadmissible in evidence under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and apart from that provision such a statement made by a person who has since died is inadmissible in evidence, because Section 32 exhaustively deals with the relevance and admissibility of evidence of persons not examined before the Court. In support of his contention Mr. Chari invited our attention to a judgment of the Madras High Court in Venkatasubba Reddi v. Emperor, ILR 54 Mad 931. In that case it was held that a statement made by a deceased person which constituted a motive for another to commit a crime could not be proved by the person who heard the deceased make the statement. Such a statement, it was held was admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act if it be a statement as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death or under explanation (1) to Section 8 of the Act, if it was shown to have accompanied or explained any set of the deceased. But, it was observed, that there is nothing in section 8 to indicate that a relevant fact an be proved by hearsay evidence. In that case, Mr. Justice Sundaram Chetti, who delivered the principal judgment of the Court observed that at first he thought that if what the victim stated about her intention to cancel her will constituted a motive for the accused to commit murder, that statement could be proved only by those who heard it from her, but after considering the provisions of section 32(1) and Section 8 of the Act, the be was constrained to accede to the contention that the evidence of the witnesses who deposed to the statements made by the victim was inadmissible. Beasely C. J. was, however, emphastic in the view expressed by him. The learned Chief Justice observed that if the intention of a person could be proved by direct evidence, then such evidence was clearly admissible to prove the relevant fact of motive, but there was nothing in the Evidence Act which rendered hearsay evidence of an intention admissible. The learned Chief Justice also criticised the trial Court for failing to draw a distinction between the relevancy of evidence and its admissibility and observed that there is nothing in Section 8 of the Act which supported the contention of the prosecution that a relevant fact can be proved by hearsay evidence. The learned Chief Justice held that the statement alleged to have been made by the victim for altering her will was inadmissible in evidence.

(2) Our attention was also invited to a judgment of the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, 66 Ind App. 66. In that case the victim of the offence, before he started to go to another village, made a statement to his wife that the wife of the accused had written and asked him to go and receive payments due to him. This statement was sought to be proved at the trial and the Privy Council held that such a statement was inadmissible in ev

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