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1960 Supreme(Bom) 22

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Raju V.B. J.
Appellants: Jankibai Tukaram
Vs.
Respondent: Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur
Civil Revn. Appln. No. 71 of 1959
Decided On: 09.03.1960
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: J.N. Chandurkar and M.N. Chandurkar, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: R.R. Dandige, Adv.

JUDGMENT - (1) In this Civil Revision Application by one Jankibai the order passed by the lande Acquisition Officer, Nagpur, rejecting her application to make a reference under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which ill hereinafter be referred to as the Act on the ground that it was time-barred is being challenged. The award was passed on 25-6-1958 and the application under Section 18 of the Act to the Collector prarying that the matter be referred under that section for the determination of the Court was on 19-8-1958. The application as rejected on the ground that the notice required by sub-secton (2) of Section 12 of the Act was served on 3-7-1958 by affixture on the house of Jankibai, and that therefoe under the proviso to Section 18 the application which was made on 19-8-58 was made more than six weeks from the date of service of notice, namely, 3-7-1958, and that the application could not therefore be entertained.

(2) A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned counsel for the opponent on the ground that this revision application oes not lie, that even if it lies it should have been made to the Tribunal under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, and that the Collector not having been made a party to the present application, the application is not maintainable.

(3) Before referring to the merits of the applications, this preliminary objection will e first disposed of. There is no merit in the contention that the revision application does not lie because sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act in terms provides :

"Any order made by the collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the mkeaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

These is no substance in the argument that the application should be made to the Tribunal appointed under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. When a reference is made under Section 18 of the Act to the Court, the nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 provides in Section 60:

"A Tribunal shall be constituted, as provided in Section 62, for the purpose of performing the functions of the court in rference to the acquisition f land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894." The Tribunal so constituted hears references made under Section 18 of the Act and is not competent to hear revision applications made under Section 18(3) of the Act which lie to the High Court. The third contention in support of the preliminary objection is also bereft of any substance and that contention is also berft on any substance and that contention is that either the Collector or the State Government should have been made a party; and that as neither the Collector nor the State Government has been made a party to he revision application, it is not maintaibable. it is clear from sub-section (3) of S. 18 of the Act that an order made by the Collector on an application made under S. 18 of the Act is subject6 to revision by th High Court as if the collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court. When the High Court is hearing a revision application against an order passed by a subordinate Court, the latter is never made a party to the revision application. I therefore reject the preliminary objection and hold that this revision application does lie to the High Court.

(4) Now to turn to the merits of the application. It is contended that the notice required to be given under S. 12(2) of the Act was not given to the applicant but was affixed on the door of her house and was seen byher only on 13-7-1958. It is contended that for the purposes of proviso to S. 18 of the Act the notice must be received by the person concerned and it is not sufficient that it is served by affixing it to the door of his house. it is also contended that the Collector was wrong in applying S. 45(3) of the Act to justify the affixing of the copy of the notice on the outer door of the applicants house and in calc




























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