Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications for special leave to appeal from orders of acquittal, as Sub-section (4) of Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

JUDGMENT - 1. The question referred to the Full Bench is:

"Can the delay on the part of the applicant in making an application under Section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal be condoned under the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on proper case having been made out?"

Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides as follows:

"Any appeal or application for a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period".

2. On behalf of the respondents, it has been urged that this section does not apply, in view of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 is as follows:

"Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by special Or local law,--

(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply."

This Sub-section can apply only when any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule. The first question for consideration therefore is whether Sub-section (4) of Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a special law. It is necessary to bear in mind that the words used are special Jaw and not special Act. In Section 41 of the Indian Penal Code the expression "special law" is defined as meaning a law applicable to a particular subject. This definition is of course only for the purposes of the Penal Code, but it indicates the sense in which the expression is used by the Legislature. In our opinion, the expression, "special law" means a provision of law, which is not applicable generally, but which applies to a particular or specified subject or class of subjects. The right to appeal from an order of acquittal was formerly conferred only upon the State. A private party or a complainant did not enjoy such right. The right was conferred for the first time in 1955, when the new Section 417 was enacted. Before the complainant can file an appeal against an Older of acquittal, he has first to make an application for special leave under Sub-section (3) of Section 417. Sub-section (4) prescribes a period of limitation for such an application. It states that no such application shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. This period of limitation is prescribed not for all appeals under the Criminal Procedure Code, or even for all appeals from the orders of acquittal. It is prescribed only for applications for special leave to appeal from orders of acquittal, It is therefore a special provision for a special subject and is consequently a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

3. Mr. Mandlekar has contended that even it Sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special law within Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, this Sub-section (2) can only apply where, as stated in the Sub-section, the special law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule. The first schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for an

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