(1-10) X X X X X X X

(11) This matter must, therefore, be considered as if the 1937 Act was applicable to the agreement for arbitration as contained in Art. X of the contract between the parties. The contention of Mr. Parpia for the Defendants is that admittedly there is an agreement between the parties to which the Protocol set forth in the First Schedule to the Act of 1937 applies and that the Plaintiffs are parties to that agreement and the plaintiffs have commenced this suit. He contends that for that reason the Defendants are entitled to stay of this suit. Mr. Banaji for the Plaintiffs, however, argues that the Plaintiffs are not parties to "a submission" as mentioned in the section. The legal proceedings by way of this suit have not been commenced by any party to the submission as required under the section. There is no submission in respect of the matter that is contained in the plaintiffs suit. The matter that is contained in the plaintiffs suit has not been agreed to be referred to any arbitration by a submission to which the plaintiffs are parties. Now, in connection with these contentions, it is necessary to emphasise and notice the language of the section. It is apparent on a reading of the section that the legal proceedings must be commenced by a party to a submission against other party to the submission. In that connection, by avoiding the words which need not be read for finding out the meaning of "submission", the section may be read as follows:

"XXXXX if any party to a submission XXXXX commences any legal proceedings in any Court against any other party to the submission XXXXX in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal proceedings may, XXXXX apply to the Court to stay the proceedings; XXXXX"

I have no doubt that having regard to the above quoted language of the section, the Defendants in this case are bound to prove and establish that the Plaintiffs are parties to a submission whereby matters in this suit have been agreed to be referred to arbitration. In default of their proving this essential fact, the above applications of the Defendants must fail.

(12) Mr. Parpia contends that the "Request" which I have quoted above in detail, whilst relating facts, is a submission as mentioned in this section. This writing was not in existence at the date of the institution of this suit; and the above notice of motion. Admittedly, the submission and the "Request" is the unilateral attempt by the Defendants to refer the matter of their claim for Rs. 5,79,498/- to arbitration of the Tribunal mentioned in the "Request". The "Request" on which Mr. Parpia relies has come into existence for the first time on April 6, 1962, being the date on which the Court of first instance dismissed the Defendants Notice of Motion which I am now again considering. Having regard to the above quoted language of the section, it also appears to me to be clear that the submission that is mentioned in the section must be made by all parties who want to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration. Some of the parties to a dispute cannot make the submission as contemplated in the section. The submission must also specify in all cases the matter agreed to be referred and legal proceedings must also relate to the matter agreed to be referred by the submission of the parties. Whatever the intent and purpose of the convention might have been and whatever the intent of the legislature was in enacting Section 3 of the 1937 Act, I am bound by the language of the section. The language does not warrant a finding that a submission as mentioned in the section can be made unilaterally or by one group of parties when the other group does not join in the submission. It is also clear that a Court would not be justified, having regard to the language of the section, to stay and proceedings, the subject