JUDGMENT - (1) This appeal arises out of an application by the parents of a boy of six, by name Arthur Beter, for compensation on account of the death of that boy alleged to have been caused by the rash and negligent driving of opponent No.1.

(2) The learned Tribunal computed the claim on three heads :

(I) Rs. 250/- for pain and suffering (ii) Rs. 1000/- for loss of services and (iii) Rs. 5,200/- for loss of expectation of life, and rounded up the total by awarding Rs. 6,000/- with costs. The application was filed by the father and mother together. The opponent No.1 as also the Insurance Company have appealed.

(3) The first point that is raised before me is that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. It arises under the following circumstances : The accident occurred at about 10-45 a.m. on 16th December 1958. The Tribunal was constituted on the 1st of December 1949 and the present application was made on the 14th of December 1959. It is argued that since the application was not made within 60 days and could not have been made within 60 days, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. It is conceded that if the accident had occurred within 60 days of the Constitution of the Tribunal or after the constitution of the Tribunal, but if the application had been made beyond the period of 60 days the Tribunal would have still jurisdiction to entertain the application if it had condoned the delay in the making of the application. In my view, the non-existence of the Tribunal or the non-formation of the Tribunal within a period of 60 days of the accident will no make any difference to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the application. A similar case was dealt with by me sitting with my brother Chandrachud J. in Appeal No. 484 of 1960 (Dayasingh Tejasingh v. Shantabai, Appeal No. 484 of 1960, D/- 17-8-1061 (Bom) ). The accident in that case occurred on 22nd March 1959 and the Tribunal came into existence on 1st December 1959 and weheld that the mere fact of non-existence of the Tribunal would not oust its jurisdiction if the claim which the applicants made was within time according to the normal law, since if a suit had been filed in a Civil Court before the constitution of the Tribunal, limitation on the ground that 60 days had expired from the date of accident could not possibly have been urged before the court. In that case also, so far as I am able to ascertain, the Tribunal while entertaining the application condoned the delay on the ground that sufficient cause was made out in not making the application within 60 days because the Tribunal itself did not exist.

(4) Mr. Patel relies on the decision in Mulak Rai v. Northern India Goods Transport Corporation Ltd., AIR 1962 Punj 307, where though it was conceded that even if the accident had occurred prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have jurisdictioin to entertain the application, it was held that as the Tribunal itself was non-existent within the time prescribed the proviso could not apply and therefore the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. It was a reverse case inasmuch as after the constitution of the Tribunal a suit was instituted by the representatives of the deceased for recovering damages and the Civil Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It is difficult to appreciate the reason why the proviso cannot apply which simply requires sufficient cause for not making the application within 60 days. If the Tribunal itself does not exist, that would be a very good cause for not making the application within 60 days provided by the law. The learned Counsel attempted to argue that our judgment was in curiam inasmuch as we had not taken into account the terms of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. In my view, it is wrong to say that we had not considered the section. As the judgment shows, we have clearly indicated the provisions of sub-section (3) prescribing the

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