(1) This reference raises a short but interesting question as to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under Section 488(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Second respondent Shantabai is the wife of the first respondent Vishnupant. On 25th January 1963 the wife filed an application for maintenance under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Judicial Magistrate. First class, Patoda, in District Bhir. At one stage, an ex parte order came to be passed against the husband on 30-3-1963 awarding maintenance to the wife and to her daughter. But that order was beside on 26-8-1963 and then commenced the proceedings out of which the present reference arises. On 16-9-1963 the husband filed a written statement wherein he took an objection to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Patoda to try the proceedings under Section 488. The Magistrate over-ruled the objection by his order dated 21-10-1963 and proceeded with the trial of the application. Three witnesses were examined on 22-10-1963 but in the meanwhile the husband had moved the Sessions Judge in revision and obtained stay of the trial. The Session Judge has in revision held that the Judicial Magistrate, first class, Patoda had no jurisdication to try the wifes application under Section 488 and has made a recommendation to this Court that the application should be dismissed leaving it open to the wife to file a similar application in the "competent court of the judicial Magistrate Bhir."

(2) As pointed out by the Sessions Judge, the matter falls to be determined under the provisions of Section 488(8) which runs as follows"

"Proceedings under this section may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife, or , as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child."

The question is what is meant by the word "district" and by the somewhat vague expression "Proceedings.... may be taken.... in any district, where he resides or is.........." The view which the Sessions Judge has taken is that though the sub-section uses the word "district" the word is used "to distinguish the District in which the husband is living from that in which the wife may be living at the time of the application for maintenance and it does not mean that any Court within the district in which the husband lives will have jurisdiction to try that application". Upon this view the Sessions Judge held that the proper Court to take congnizance of the petition in the first case is the Court within whose jurisdiction the husband resides.

(3) It seems to me that the interpretation which the learned Sessions Judge has put upon the word "district" is not correct. It is not only the word "district" which one must have regard to, but the entire expression "any district where he resides". There appears to be no reason why the express use of the word "district" by the Legislature should be given any meaning different from the normal connotation of that word and I can see no reason at all why in spite of the use of the words "any district where he (the husband) resides", it should be limited only to a Court within that district within whose jurisdiction the husband resides.

(4) The object of the section appears to be clear enough : Where a husband and wife have fallen out and the wife is required to make an application either for herself or for her child, she should not be put to the harassment of going to the very place where the husband is at the time of the application residing. If that were so, the recalcitrant husband who has fallen out with the wife could move about from place to place and thus make it impossible for the wife to choose a place in which to prefer her application for maintenance. At the same time it is clear that a fractious woman should not be enabled to harass her husband by making an application at any place very far from the place where the husband resides after their separation, and it seems to me that having regard to the