The B.E.S.T. Undertaking, though not a separate legal entity, was owned and operated by the Municipal Corporation, and therefore, the claim for compensation against the B.E.S.T. Undertaking was, in effect, a claim against the Municipal Corporation.

Headnote:
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - CLAIMS TRIBUNAL - AMENDMENT OF APPLICATION - SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY - B.E.S.T. UNDERTAKING - OWNERSHIP BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - MISDESCRIPTION - LIMITATION - BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, SECTIONS 3(MM), 4(D), 4(G), 5(1), 5(2), 63(JJA), 63(JJB), 460-A TO 460-PP - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, SECTIONS 110-A, 111-A - RULE 291, FORM COMP. A - CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ORDER XXX, RULE 10.
Fact of the Case:

Petitioner, injured in a collision with a B.E.S.T. bus, filed an application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act against the B.E.S.T. Undertaking, believing it to be the owner of the bus. Later, upon learning that the Municipal Corporation was the actual owner, the petitioner sought to amend the application by substituting the Municipal Corporation as the opposite party. The Tribunal dismissed the application as barred by limitation, holding that the B.E.S.T. Undertaking was not a legal entity and could not be sued.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the B.E.S.T. Undertaking was merely a misdescription of the Municipal Corporation, which was the true owner of the undertaking. The Court further held that the claim was not barred by limitation as it was filed within the prescribed period from the date of the accident.
Issues: 1. Whether the B.E.S.T. Undertaking was a legal entity capable of being sued. 2. Whether the claim was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act to conclude that the B.E.S.T. Undertaking was not a separate legal entity but was owned and operated by the Municipal Corporation. 2. The Court held that the claim was not barred by limitation as the petitioner had filed the application within the prescribed period from the date of the accident.
Final Decision: The Court set aside the Tribunal's order and directed it to proceed with the application for compensation on the basis that the Municipal Corporation was the true owner of the B.E.S.T. Undertaking and that the claim was not barred by limitation.

JUDGMENT - K.K. Desai, J.

1. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution the petitioner questions the legality of the order dated December 10, 1964 made by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissing the petitioners application for compensation as against the Bombay Municipal Corporation, being the fourth respondent in this petition.

2. The relevant facts are as follows:--On October 3, 1962, as a result of collision with a motor transport bus of B. E. S.T. Undertaking, the petitioner was knocked down and suffered from fracture, of the neck of the left femur and certain other injuries. Having regard to the fact that the B. E. S. T. Undertaking was of the ownership of the Corporation, the petitioner served a statutory notice under Section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on the General Manager, B. E. S. T. Undertaking. The petitioner then in accordance with the provisions in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act instituted the application No. 649 of 1962 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal claiming compensation amounting in all to Rs. 86,000/-. In paragraph 15 of the application he mentioned, according to the prescribed form, the name and address o£ the owner of the vehicle. The name mentioned was "B. E. S. T. Bombay".

3. In paragraph 3 of the written statement filed on or about March 19, 1964 on behalf of the driver Abdul Gafar Ismail and the "B. E. S. T. Undertaking, Bombay" and sworn by the General Manager of the above undertaking, it was contended that the B. E. S. T, Undertaking was not a legal entity and could not be sued and/or made a party to the application and the claim against the B. E. S. T. Undertaking should, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

4. In consequence of the above contention, by oral application made on June 23, 1964, the petitioner asked for amendment or the application by joining the Bombay Municipal Corporation in the title as the third opposite party. That application was granted on June 23, 1964 subject, however, to the question of limitation. The petitioner was permitted to file an affidavit in connection with the application for amendment and the Municipal Corporation was given liberty to file an affidavit in reply.

5. The petitioner then filed affidavit dated July 4, 1964, whilst on behalf of the driver Abdul Gafar and the B. E. S. T. Undertaking and the Municipal Corporation, an affidavit dated September 29, 1964 was filed by the Accident Officer of the B. E. S. T. Undertaking of the Municipal Corporation. The petitioner stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his affidavit that the B. E. S. T. Undertaking was merely a misdescription for the Bombay Municipal Corporation and he had filed, the affidavit by way of application for the formal addition of the Bombay Municipal Corporation as opposite party No. 3 or for substitution of the Bombay Municipal Corporation for opposite party No. 2 (the B. E. S. T. Undertaking).

6. The contention of the opposite par-ties in their affidavit was that the B. E. S. T. Undertaking was not merely misdescription for the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The joint of the Corporation would be addition of a new party from the date of the amendment to be granted and the amendment should not be granted as the claim on the date of the "amendment would be barred by the law of limitation,

7. In connection with these questions raised by the affidavits made on behalf of these three opposite parties, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal by the above order dated December 10, 1964 held that the owner of the motor bus was the Municipal Corporation. The B. E. S. T. Undertaking could not have been sued as the owner of the bus. The B. E. S. T. Undertaking was not a legal entity and in the result in effect, opposite party No. 2 did not exist at all and nobody has been sued as the owner of the bus and therefore, there was no question of substituting the Municipal Corporation in place of opposite party No. 2 (B. E. S. T. Undertaking). The further observation was that i

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