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1968 Supreme(Bom) 129

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
K.K. Desai, J.
Appellants: Vithalbhai T. Patel
Vs.
Respondent: Shyamlal Durgadas Khanna
Civil Revn. Appln. No. 454 of 1967 Decided On: 19.11.1968
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: J.M. Patel and B.S. Purohit, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: M.G. Mani, Adv.

The court has jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance with the conditions imposed by an order granting leave to defend even after the defendant has failed to comply with the conditions, as long as the court has not passed an ex parte decree in favor of the plaintiff.

Headnote:

SUMMARY PROCEDURE - ORDER 37 RULE 3(4) - EXTENSION OF TIME - JURISDICTION - COURT NOT FUNCTUS OFFICIO - APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME NOT SECOND APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO DEFEND - CITY CIVIL COURT RULES, RULE 123 - SECTION 148 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Fact of the Case:

The defendant failed to deposit the second installment of Rs. 2,000/- within the time limit set by the court order granting him leave to defend. He applied for an extension of time, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff challenged the order, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to extend the time and that the application was a second application for leave to defend, which was not permissible.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance with the conditions imposed by the order granting leave to defend. The court reasoned that the failure of the defendant to comply with the conditions did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to an ex parte decree and that the court, therefore, remained seized of the suit and had the power to make any just or necessary order, including an order for extension of time.

Issues: 1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance with the conditions imposed by the order granting leave to defend. 2. Whether the application for extension of time was a second application for leave to defend.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance with the conditions imposed by the order granting leave to defend because the failure of the defendant to comply with the conditions did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to an ex parte decree and the court, therefore, remained seized of the suit and had the power to make any just or necessary order, including an order for extension of time. 2. The court held that the application for extension of time was not a second application for leave to defend because the rules of the City Civil Court do not require defendants to make any independent application for leave to defend and that leave to defend is ordinarily granted in the proceedings by way of summons for judgment instituted by the plaintiff.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiff's revisional application and upheld the trial court's order extending the time for compliance with the conditions imposed by the order granting leave to defend.

JUDGMENT - 1. This is a revisional application on behalf of the original plaintiff from the order dated October 28, 1966, made on the Chamber summons dated October 17, 1966, whereby the City Civil Court directed that the time to deposit the balance amount of Rs. 2,000/-pursuant to the order dated August 5, 1966 be extended till November 1, 1966. The above order dated August 5, 1966 was made on the summons for judgment taken out by the plaintiff. By that order the defendant was directed to deposit the sum of Rs. 7,725/- by three instalments respectively of Rs. 3,308.30 within one week fon or before August 12. 1966), Rs. 2,000/- within eight weeks (on or before October 9, 1966) and the balance of Rs. 2,416.70 within four weeks thereafter. The deposit order was conditional order granting leave to the defendant to defend the suit

2. In pursuance of the above order dated August 5, 1966, the defendant duly deposited in trial Court the sum of Rs. 3,308.30 on August 12, 1966. He failed to deposit the sum of Rs. 2.000/- on or before October 9, 1966. By the chamber summons dated October 17. 1966, he applied for extension of time to enable him to make the deposit of the second instalment. The trial Court thereupon extended the time to make deposit till November I, 1966.

3. Mr. Patel for the plaintiff contends that the order extending time is invalid, because the Court had no jurisdiction to make that order and the application for extension of time was in effect a second application for leave to defend. That second application is not contemplated by any of the revisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and was in fact beyond time and, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

4. In support of his first contention Mr. Patel has relied upon Sub-rule (4) of Rule 3 of Order 37 as amended by this Court and also on Rule 123 of the City Civil Court Rules and Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his submission the true effect of Sub-rule (4) read with Rule 123 is that upon default being made by a defendant in complying with and carrying out the conditions fixed by the order granting him leave to defend, the plaintiff becomes entitled to judgment forthwith. The default made by a defendant in complying with such conditions automatically entitles the plaintiff to a decree for the amount mentioned in the summons for judgment. In the result, the Court becomes functus officio and is left With no powers to extend time fixed for compliance with such conditions. In those circumstances, the Court cannot have any power under Section 148 of the Code to extend time fixed for compliance with conditions. In the result, the Court can have no jurisdiction to extend time in connection with compliance of conditions fixed by an order granting leave to defend.

5. The relevant part of Sub-rule (4) runs as follows:

" xxxxx if the defendant be permitted to defend xxxxx the Judge shall direct that on failure to complete the security (if any), or to carry out such other directions as the Court or the Judge may have given within the time limited in order, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith".

6. The relevant part of Rule 123 of the City Civil Court Rules provides:

"If the defendant does not complete Ms security (if any) or carry out such other directions as the Judge may have given within the time limited in the order, the plaintiff shall be at liberty to apply to put the suit down for hearing forthwith x x x x x, as if no such order" (granting leave to defend) "had been made".

7. Now, therefore, it is quite clear that in connection with a default made by a defendant in complying with the directions fixed by the order granting him leave to defend, under Sub-rule (4), the provision is that the Judge shall by the very order direct that on failure to carry out such directions the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith. The provision in Rule 123 is that the plaintiff should be at liberty to apply to put the suit down for hearing forthwith as if the order






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