A subsequent suit is barred by Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, only if it is brought on the same right which is the subject-matter of the order under Rules 98, 99 or 101 of Order XXI, Civil Procedure Code.

Headnote:
LIMITATION ACT - ARTICLE 11-A - ORDER XXI, RULES 97, 99, 103, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SUIT FOR POSSESSION BASED ON TITLE - PREVIOUS ORDER IN EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS - APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 11-A - DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUIT ON SAME RIGHT AND SUIT ON DIFFERENT RIGHT.
Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for possession of a house based on title as a purchaser from his predecessor-in-title. The property was previously owned by Watave, who had filed a suit against the defendant for eviction as a tenant. The suit was decreed, but the defendant's brother, defendant No. 2, obstructed the execution of the decree, claiming independent possession. Watave filed an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was dismissed. Watave appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the order was not appealable. Watave then sold the property to the plaintiff, who filed the present suit. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and the lower appellate court confirmed the dismissal.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as it was based on a different right than the right claimed by Watave in the execution proceedings. The court found that Watave could have abandoned his right as a landlord and maintained a suit against the defendants based on title without any reference to the order in execution, and that the plaintiff, as Watave's successor-in-title, was entitled to maintain a similar suit.
Issues: Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as it was based on the same right as the right claimed by Watave in the execution proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the test for determining whether a subsequent suit is barred by Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is whether the subsequent suit is brought on the same right which is the subject-matter of the order under Rules 98, 99 or 101 of Order XXI, Civil Procedure Code. If the subsequent suit is based on the same right, it will be barred by Article 11-A. However, if the subsequent suit is brought on a different right, it will not be barred by Article 11-A.
Final Decision: The court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit for possession with costs throughout.

JUDGMENT - Nain, J.

1. This is an appeal by the original plaintiff against the judgment dated 18th June 1962 of the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge, Sholapur, confirming the dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff by the learned Civil Judge. Junior Division, Mangalwedha. The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge has, however, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff only on the ground that the suit was barred under Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

2. The facts leading to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows:--

The suit from which the present appeal arises was for possession of a house bearing Municipal No. 401 at Mangalwedha in Sholapur District and for mesne profits based on title as purchaser from the plaintiffs predecessor. This property, prior to the said purchase, belonged to one Watave. The defendant No. 1, according to Watave, was his tenant under a lease for 11 months. In 1953 Watave filed against the defendant No. 1 Civil Suit No. 4 of 1953 for eviction alleging that he had determined the lease of the defendant No. 1. The said suit was decreed by the trial Court. The defendant No. 1 appealed to the District Court. The said appeal, being First Appeal No. 439 of 1953 was dismissed. Thereafter Watave filed Dar-khast No. 8 of 1955 for execution of the decree for eviction against the defendant No. 1, We might mention that the defendant No. 2 is the brother of the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 3 is their mother. When warrant for possession was taken for execution, the defendant No. 2 obstructed. Watave filed an application under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 97 of the Civil P.C. for removal of obstruction, being Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 3955. The defendant No. 2 contended that he had separated from his brother, the defendant No. 1, in 1944. He further contended that the suit premises were in hia occupation independently of the defendant No. 1 and not under the defendant No. 1. He, therefore, contended that the decree could not be executed against him. This contention was upheld by the trial Court by an order dated 4th April 1957 and the Darkhast filed by Watave was dismissed. Watave appealed to the District Court and on 11th October 1957, the said appeal was dismissed on the ground that the order was not appealable.

2A. Thereafter by a sale deed dated 25th March 1958, Watave sold the property to the present plaintiff. On 10th October 1958, the present plaintiff filed the suit from which the present appeal arises for a declaration of his title to the house bearing Municipal No. 401 at Mangalwedha and for possession. As we will show by reference to the plaint itself, the plaintiff did not contest the order dated 4th April 1957 made in execution proceedings against his predecessor-in-title, Watave. The defendant No. 1 filed his written statement in the said suit in which he contended that he had nothing to do with the suit premises and that the defendant No. 2 was in possession independently of him as their owner. He also affirmed that in 1944 the two brothers had separated. In his written statement the defendant No. 2 contended that there had been a partition between the brothers in 1844 and that he was in possession of the suit premises ever since 1944. He claimed that he had been in adverse possession for a period exceeding 12 years and had become owner of the suit property. He further contended that the sale deed dated 25th March 1958 executed by Watave in favour of the plaintiff was champertous and, therefore, void. He also contended that the plaintiffs suit, not having been filed within a period of one year from 4th April 1957, was barred by law of limitation under Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The defendant No. 3 in her written statement supported the case of the defendant No. 2.

2B. The trial Court held the title of the plaintiff proved. It also held that the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title had been in possession of the suit property within a period

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